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Introduction
In this paper, I consider a simple search market in which agents search for objects. The market
features scarcity, i.e., there are weakly more agents searching than there are objects available in
the market. Additionally, the objects vary in quality so that some of the objects are desirable
and some are not. The main result of the paper is that a search protocol that makes it is
easy for agents to sort between the desirable and the undesirable objects actually lowers social
welfare by generating congestion, even though an individual agent would prefer such a protocol.
The model is applied to study a one-sided consumer search with non-transferable utility as well
as two-sided labor search market with Nash bargaining.
To highlight the tension between an individual agent’s preferences and social welfare, con-
sider the following example. Suppose Jane just enrolled for health insurance. She wants to
choose a high quality doctor as her primary care physician (PCP). From Jane’s perspective,
she is in a market without prices because her health expenses are covered by her insurance.
She just has to search for the best “object” (doctor).
One possible search protocol for Jane is to randomly sample from the list of doctors covered
by her network until she finds one that is high quality. I call this a random search protocol.
Because Jane does not know a doctor’s quality prior to sampling, she may have to search a
long time.
There is another way Jane can search if she lives in California; she can use a ranking of
doctors published by Consumer Reports magazine to sort through the doctors in her network.1
I call this a directed search protocol. In an isolated world where Jane is the only insurance
enrollee, directed search is superior to random search because it allows Jane to instantly match
with the best PCP.
However, in reality, many Californians enroll for health insurance, and each enrollee wants
a high quality PCP. Additionally, it is unlikely that there are enough doctors to service all the
enrollees which implies that doctors are a scarce resource.2 If enrollees are able to direct their
search based on the Consumer Reports rankings, they would compete to match with the scarce
number of high quality doctors leading to congestion. The main result of this paper shows
that the congestion inefficiencies from directed search wipe out any informational benefit the
enrollees get from using the Consumer Reports rankings. Ultimately, they would have been
1Consumer Reports publishes doctor and doctor-group rankings also in Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mas-
sachusetts, Ohio, Washington, and Wisconsin.
2The Association of American Medical Colleges document significant shortages in both primary care physicians
and specialists. Dall et al. (2018)
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better off randomly sampling without any additional information about PCP quality.
Formally, I study how different search protocols affect welfare in a steady-state search
market. One side of the market is composed of objects while the other side of the market
is composed of rational and forward-looking agents. The basic search market has four char-
acteristics: (i) utility is non-transferable, (ii) objects are a scarce resource, (iii) the objects
are vertically differentiated by quality and the agents have homogeneous preferences for higher
quality objects, and (iv) search is frictionless, i.e., the maximal number of agent-object pairs
are formed. The first assumption is relaxed when I generalize the basic model to accommodate
a labor search market with Nash bargaining. I discuss the implications of relaxing the last three
assumptions later in the introduction and defer a formal treatment until Online Appendix A.
The first search protocol considered is random search in which agents are randomly paired
to objects from the entire search market. If an agent is paired to an object, she observes the
object’s quality. The agent then either matches and exits the market with the object or declines
to match. In the latter case, both the object and the agent return to the search market. A
fraction γ ∈ (0, 1) of the agents and objects left in the search market “die,” which can be
thought of as the cost of searching.3 Finally, new agents and objects flow into the market with
the quality of the newly arriving objects distributed according to some exogenous absolutely
continuous distribution function F .
The second search protocol considered is directed search in which the entire search market
is segmented by quality into smaller sub-markets. All objects contained in a sub-market have
the same quality and all objects of the same quality are in the same sub-market. The agents can
distinguish between the different sub-markets, i.e., the agents can use sub-markets to sort the
objects by quality. In each period, an agent chooses which sub-market to enter. The agent is
then randomly paired to an object within that sub-market with the short-side of the sub-market
being rationed to the long-side. If an agent is paired to an object, she matches and exits the
market. Before the period ends, a fraction γ of the unmatched agents and objects left in the
search market “die,” and a mass of new agents and objects flow into the market.
Under a random search protocol, a stationary equilibrium is characterized by a quality cutoff
such that an agent would rather continue searching than match with an object whose quality
is below the cutoff. We can think of the cutoff as an agent’s “pickiness.” In the aggregate, the
agents’ pickiness gives rise to a negative externality in the form of an adversely selected market;
3The model can be modified to have different death probabilities for agents and objects without changing the
main results as long as the scarcity assumption continues to hold. Effectively, 1− γ serves as a discount factor
for the agents.
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the desirable high quality objects above the cutoff leave the market quickly while the rejected
low quality objects below the cutoff linger in the market.
The main drawback of the random search protocol is that an agent is paired to a low
quality object below her pickiness cutoff with positive probability. To make matters worse,
the adversely selected market makes it more likely for an agent to pair with a low quality
object than a high quality object. These inherent drawbacks of the random search protocol do
not exist under a directed search protocol which enables the agent to sort the desirable high
quality objects from the undesirable low quality objects. Can we then improve social welfare
by changing the search protocol to directed search?
In the basic model of this paper, the answer is no. The main result states that social
welfare is higher under random search than under directed search regardless of the search cost
γ or the distribution of quality F . Under directed search, the agents compete to match with
the scarce number of high quality objects giving rise to congestion. Equilibrium is once again
determined by a quality cutoff (pickiness) such that an agent would rather wait in a congested
sub-market above the cutoff until a desirable high quality object is rationed to her instead of
enter an un-congested sub-market below the cutoff that guarantees an immediate match with
a low quality object.
Furthermore, the agents are pickier when they can direct their search than when they search
randomly. Under random search, an agent’s pickiness is characterized by an intertemporal
trade-off between the object she can match with today and the possibly better objects she may
get in the future if she continues to search at a cost. Under directed search, an agent’s pickiness
is characterized by a contemporaneous trade-off between the object she can get today with
certainty and the possibly better objects she may get today through rationing. As the latter
trade-off does not involve the search cost, the agents under directed search can afford to be
pickier which makes the negative externalities they impose on the search market more severe.
Ultimately, the additional information and flexibility under directed search leads to lower social
welfare.
When the cost of searching γ vanishes, so does the welfare gap between the two search
protocols. Intuitively, when the cost of searching disappears, a random searcher is equivalent to
a directed searcher; she can keep searching until she gets her desired quality without incurring
any loss. Thus, welfare under random and directed search coincide in the limit. Importantly,
the limit outcome as the search cost vanishes is inefficient.
The parsimonious model in this paper permits a tractable way of comparing the two search
protocols without changing the underlying environment. While it is not tailored to a specific
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application, the basic model can be generalized to study a labor market in which firms play the
role of the agents and workers of differing productivity play the role of the objects. In order
to accommodate such a labor search market, I extend the model in two dimensions: First,
both the firms and the workers are strategic with each side of the market looking to maximize
payoffs. Second, utility is transferable in the form of wages that are endogenously determined
on the equilibrium path through ex-post Nash Bargaining, as in Mortensen (1982), Diamond
(1982), and Pissarides (1985).
As an example, consider the labor market for graduating college students. Under random
search, a firm simply posts a vacancy. Once a student applies and has been interviewed (random
pairing arrives and productivity is observed), the firm decides whether or not to hire the student
at some bargained wage. There is a possibility that the vacancy remains unfilled if the student’s
productivity is too low. On the other hand, if students’ productivity is correlated to the quality
of the universities they attend, then each university can be seen as a sub-market. Under directed
search, a firm can choose to recruit only the students of a specific university (e.g. campus career
fairs). However, there may be a possibility that a vacancy goes unfilled because too many other
firms also recruit at the same university.
Similar to the basic model with non-transferable utility, when utility is transferable through
wages determined by the Nash bargaining solution, there exist equilibrium outcomes in directed
search markets with a lower social welfare than in random search markets. The result stands
in stark contrast to the literature on the efficiency of directed search with posted prices, which
I discuss further in the Related Literature section. I also show that if the firms have all the
bargaining power, the equilibrium outcomes of random and directed search in the transferable
utility model coincide to the corresponding outcomes of the basic model with non-transferable
utility. Essentially, when the firms have all the bargaining power, they can extract the full
surplus which reduces the workers to non-strategic objects. Furthermore, if the firms do not
have all the bargaining power, then equilibrium outcomes in both random and directed search
markets converge to a competitive market outcome as the cost of searching vanishes. The
competitive market limit result is in line with Lauermann (2013) who provides necessary and
sufficient conditions under which the equilibrium outcomes of search and bargaining models
converge to a Walrasian outcome as search frictions disappear.
In Online Appendix A, I consider several extensions to the basic model. One of the main
assumptions of the basic model is scarcity: the ratio of objects to agents in the market is
less than unity. More generally, I characterize two cutoffs λ¯ ≥ λ > 1 (which depend on the
search cost and the quality distribution) such that random search dominates directed search
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whenever the ratio of objects to agents is below λ, and directed search dominates random search
whenever the ratio is above λ¯. Intuitively, it is still possible to have more objects than agents
in the market (so that the scarcity assumption is violated) and yet have more agents than the
objects they find desirable in equilibrium. When the mass of objects is not much larger than the
mass of agents, directed search protocol still leads to a significant welfare loss due to congestion
externalities. On the other hand, if objects are sufficiently plentiful in the market, congestion
become negligible and directed search starts to dominate random search in terms of welfare.
In the basic model, I assume that the agents have homogeneous preferences and that search
is frictionless. These two assumptions imply that there are no disadvantages in either search
protocol due to exogenously assumed coordination failures.4 Consequently, the inefficiencies in
the basic model arise purely from the agents’ strategic response to the underlying search proto-
col. The same inefficiencies would be present in a more general model even if the magnitudes of
these inefficiencies will depend on the additional structure placed on the more general model.
In Online Appendix A, I relax the two assumptions and show that if search is not too frictional,
or if the amount of preference heterogeneity is small, social welfare is still higher under random
search than directed search.
Finally, I also consider a hybrid search protocol: The search market is segmented into finite
sub-markets, and each sub-market provides a coarse signal of quality of the objects it contains.
The agents first choose which sub-market to enter (similar to directed search) based on the
coarse information they observe. The agents then randomly sample objects from within the
chosen sub-market (similar to random search).5 I show that welfare is higher under the random
search protocol than under a hybrid search protocol.
Related Literature
There is a large literature in search theory that shows that directed search is more efficient than
random search. In the context of exchange economies, Butters (1977) shows that search directed
through price-advertising leads to socially efficient outcomes, and Peters (1991) shows that
directed search yields a more efficient outcome than random search. Additionally, Peters (1997,
2000) shows that the equilibrium allocations in finite markets with directed search converge
4For example, most frictional search models assume (implicitly or explicitly) that more agent-object pairs
form when agents search within one big market, as in random search, than when agents search in smaller
segmented sub-markets, as in directed search. This would confer an exogenously assumed disadvantage on
directed search. Conversely, introducing horizontal differentiation adds an advantage to directed search which
facilitates assortative matching.
5Loosely, directed search is a special case of hybrid search in which the sub-markets provide perfect information
while random search is a special case of hybrid search in which the sub-markets provide no information.
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to some competitive market outcome as the number of buyers and sellers grows large. In the
context of labor markets, Montgomery (1991) and Moen (1997) show that the equilibrium
outcomes under directed search correspond to the socially efficient outcomes of a competitive
labor market. Similarly, Mortensen and Wright (2002) show that directed search always leads
to socially efficient outcomes whereas random search is efficient only when search frictions
disappear. The efficiency of directed search also holds in labor search markets with ex-ante
firm investments (Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999a) and with risk-averse workers (Acemoglu and
Shimer, 1999b), and in markets with two-sided heterogeneity (Shi, 2002; Shimer, 2005; Eeckhout
and Kircher, 2010). Even without posted prices, Kim and Kircher (2015) show that directed
search based on cheap talk can lead to socially efficient outcomes if the trading mechanism is
an efficient first-price auction.
The sharp contrast between the previous literature and the results of this paper stem from
the fact that the prior papers study search markets in which there is a mechanism (posted prices
or auctions) to internalize the search externalities created by agents resulting in an efficient
outcome. In this paper, utility is either non-transferable or is transferable through prices that
are determined ex-post. In either case, negative externalities generated in the search markets
cannot be fully off-set by changing the ex-post value of a match. Of course, if the agents in
this paper could direct their search based on both quality and ex-ante posted prices, there is
a socially efficient outcome in this model as well. Hence, one can interpret the results in this
paper as showing that in markets without posted prices (or the ability to commit to the posted
prices), directed search is not only inefficient but is less efficient than random search.
Menzio (2005, 2007) studies a labor search market with ex-post transfers in which firms with
differing productivity send cheap talk messages and workers use these messages to choose with
which firm to match. Directed search endogenously arises in a separating equilibrium whereas
random search arises in a babbling equilibrium.6 Similar to this paper, Menzio shows that con-
gestion inefficiencies accompany directed search whenever it arises in equilibrium. However, in
a separating equilibrium (which gives rise to directed search), there are also signaling inefficien-
cies. Furthermore, since the matching technology is concave, fewer matches are created under
directed search than under random search. The interaction of all these inefficiencies makes it
difficult in Menzio (2005, 2007) to establish an unambiguous relationship between the search
protocol and welfare. In contrast, in this paper, there are no signaling distortions as the search
protocol is exogenously given. Furthermore, the matching technology is frictionless and places
both directed and random search protocols on equal footing. By abstracting away from the
6In a separating equilibrium, different productivity types send different credible messages.
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signaling inefficiencies and frictional matching technology, this paper identifies one of the key
sources of welfare loss in directed search protocol.
More generally, we can interpret the differences between random and directed search as
a difference in the timing of information. Agents have more ex-ante information about their
match payoffs under directed search than under random search. As such, the adverse effects
of ex-ante information in search markets studied in this paper are in the same spirit to the
Hirshleifer effect in exchange economies (Hirshleifer, 1971; Schlee, 2001). More recently, Lester
et al. (2016) show that increasing transparency in a search market for “lemons” is sometimes
detrimental.
This paper is also related to the literature on adverse selection in search markets. The
effect of adverse selection has been studied by Burdett and Coles (1997) in marriage matching
markets, Davis (2001) in labor markets, Inderst (2005) in insurance markets, and Lauermann
(2012) in exchange economies. However, all these papers focus only on random search markets.
While not directly related to this paper, the literature on market and search platform design
has pointed out that limiting choices (Halaburda et al., 2017), limiting the number of potential
matches (Arnosti et al., 2015), limiting preference signaling (Coles et al., 2013), or preventing
one side of the market from initiating contact with potential matches (Kanoria and Saban,
2017) could all be welfare improving.
The parsimonious search model in this paper can be seen as a variant of Gale (1987), and
Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007, 2008). Recently, Lauermann (2013) uses a similar model
of search to study how limits of equilibrium allocations relate to competitive market outcomes
when search frictions disappears. Similarly, Olszewski and Wolinsky (2016) use a similar model
to study search markets for objects with multiple attributes.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 1, I describe the basic model,
derive the unique stationary equilibrium outcomes under random and directed search, and
present the main result that random search is more efficient than directed search in markets with
scarcity. In Section 2, I extend the model to accommodate transfers and derive the equilibrium
outcomes in a labor search market with ex-post Nash bargaining. Section 3 concludes. All
remaining extensions are presented in the Online Appendix.
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1. Basic Search Model
1.1. Setup
I consider a search market with agents (she) on one side and objects (it) on the other side.
The objects are of differing quality denoted by θ ∈ Θ , [0, 1]. I assume that the objects are
non-strategic, i.e., they make no decisions and have no preferences.7 In contrast, the agents are
strategically searching with the hopes of being matched to a high quality object.
Time is discrete. In each period, the agents and the objects in the search market are paired
together. The specific details of how they pair-up is discussed later. If an agent has been paired
to an object, she observes its quality θ and either matches with it or rejects it. If the agent
decides to match, she exits the market with the object and gets a utility of u(θ) = θ. If the
agent rejects the object, both the object and the agent return to the search market. In each
period the agent is unmatched, she gets a payoff of 0.
Before the period ends, a fraction γ ∈ (0, 1) of the agents and objects left in the search
market “die”. Finally, a mass ka of new agents and a mass ko of new objects flow into the market.
The newly arriving objects have quality distributed according to an absolutely continuous
distribution function F with a bounded and positive density function f .8 An important feature
of the search model is scarcity: (weakly) fewer objects than agents flow into the market with
ka ≥ ko > 0.
The search market in each period t is characterized by the tuple Ψt , 〈Gt,Mat ,M ot 〉 where
Gt : Θ→ [0, 1] is an endogenously determined market quality distribution, Mat is the total mass
of agents in the market, and M ot is the total mass of objects in the market. Thus, M
o
t Gt(θ)
represents the total mass of objects available in the search market in period t whose quality
is at most θ. I will refer to Ψt as the market composition in period t. The strategic decisions
made by the agents in period t determine the market composition in t+ 1, and so on.
1.2. Steady State Markets
Throughout the paper, the focus is on steady state Markov outcomes: an agent’s decision
in period t depends only on the current market composition Ψt. Furthermore, the market
composition is stationary with Ψt = Ψt+1. Henceforth, I will omit all time indices.
7In Section 2, I consider a search market with strategic players on both sides: firms (instead of agents) and
workers (instead of objects) who differ in their productivity.
8Specifically, there exist constants 0 < f < f¯ <∞ such that f(θ) ∈ (f, f¯) for all θ ∈ Θ.
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Let ` : Θ → [0, 1] be a measurable function where `(θ) is the probability that a type θ
object exits the market through a match with an agent under some steady state outcome. Let
G(·; `) : Θ→ [0, 1] be the market distribution that arises in such a steady state, and let M a(`)
and M o(`) be the corresponding market population of agents and objects respectively.
The steady state market is characterized by the balance of the outflow and the inflow of
objects and agents in each period. For each θ′ < θ′′, the inflow-outflow dynamics for objects
must satisfy
ko
(
F (θ′′)− F (θ′))︸ ︷︷ ︸
inflow
= M o(`)
∫ θ′′
θ′
(
`(ω) + (1− `(ω))γ
)
dG(ω; `)︸ ︷︷ ︸
outflow
. (1)
Similarly, the inflow-outflow dynamics for agents must satisfy
ka︸︷︷︸
inflow of
agents
= M o(`)
∫
Θ
`(ω)dG(ω; `)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
outflow via
match
+ γ
M a(`)−M o(`)∫
Θ
`(ω)dG(ω; `)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
outflow via
death
. (2)
Since a match involves an object-agent pair, the mass of agents that leave the market through
a match with an object is equal to the mass of objects that leave the market through a match
with an agent, given by the first term on the right-hand side of (2). Of the remaining agents,
a fraction γ leave through death, given by second term on the right-hand side of (2).
Lemma 1
Let ` : Θ→ [0, 1] be some measurable function with `(θ) representing the probability that a type
θ object leaves the market through a match. For any γ > 0, there exists a unique steady state
market composition Ψ = 〈G(·; `),M a(`),M o(`)〉 with
G(θ; `) = EF
[(
γ + (1− γ)`)−1]−1 ∫ θ
0
(
γ + (1− γ)`(ω)
)−1
dF (ω), ∀θ ∈ Θ (3)
M o(`) = koEF
[(
γ + (1− γ)`)−1] , (4)
M a(`) = M o(`) + γ−1(ka − ko). (5)
Proof: Appendix.
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From (3), it is straightforward to check that that the market distributionG(·; `) is absolutely
continuous. Thus, it admits a density function g(·; `) which is almost everywhere positive and
bounded. Furthermore, M a(`) is greater than M o(`) if, and only if, ka is greater than ko.
It is important to note that the above characterization takes ` as exogenously given. Over
the next few sections, ` is endogenously derived in equilibrium from the agents’ strategy, which
itself depends on the market composition.
1.3. Random Search Protocol
Under a random search protocol, the agents and objects in the search market are randomly
paired in each period. An agent observes an object’s type only after being paired to it. Prior
to a pairing, the agent only knows the prevailing market composition Ψ , 〈G,Ma,M o〉.
I assume that the maximal number of pairs is achieved. The assumption implies that there
are no inefficiencies due to some exogenously assumed coordination failure in the search and
matching technology. As there are (weakly) more agents than objects, each object gets paired
to a single agent with probability 1 whereas each agent gets paired to a single object with
probability M o/Ma.
An agent who is paired to an object either matches and exits the market or declines to
match and searches again next period with probability 1− γ. For a given market composition
Ψ, let U r(Ψ) be an agent’s value from randomly searching, defined by
U r(Ψ) =
M o
Ma
∫
Θ
max{θ, (1− γ)U r(Ψ)}dG(θ) +
(
1− M
o
Ma
)
(1− γ)U r(Ψ).
An agent’s optimal strategy is given by a cutoff θ¯(Ψ) such that the agent matches to any
object of quality θ > θ¯(Ψ) and rejects any object of quality θ < θ¯(Ψ). The cutoff is characterized
by the indifference condition
θ¯(Ψ) = (1− γ)U r(Ψ),
the marginal quality at which the agent is indifferent between matching to her current object
and continuing to search for a possibly better match.9
Each agent’s cutoff strategy depends on the market composition Ψ which she takes as a
given. However, the market composition is itself an endogenous variable that depends on the
9Since Θ = [0, 1] and γ ∈ (0, 1), it is never the case that θ¯(Ψ) = 0; the agent can always do better by continuing
to search and accepting any quality strictly greater than her outside option. The results in the paper easily
generalize to the case where Θ = [θl, θu] where the indifference condition satisfies θ¯(Ψ) ≥ (1 − γ)Ur(Ψ), with
equality if θ¯(Ψ) > θl.
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aggregate effect of the agents’ strategies.
When all agents follow a cutoff strategy θˆ ∈ Θ, any object of type θ < θˆ leaves the market
through a match with probability `(θ) = 0, while any object of type θ > θˆ leaves the market
through a match with probability `(θ) = 1. The market composition as described in (3)-(5) then
takes a particularly simple form; with some abuse of notation, Ψ = 〈G(·; θˆ),M a(θˆ),M o(θˆ)〉 is
given by:10
G(θ; θˆ) =

F (θ)
γ+(1−γ)F (θˆ) for θ ≤ θˆ
γF (θ)+(1−γ)F (θˆ)
γ+(1−γ)F (θˆ) for θ ≥ θˆ
, (6)
M o(θˆ) = γ−1ko
(
γ + (1− γ)F (θˆ)
)
, (7)
M a(θˆ) = γ−1
(
ka − ko(1− γ)(1− F (θˆ))
)
. (8)
Definition 1 A random search stationary Markov Equilibrium (SME) is given by a cutoff
θr ∈ Θ and a market composition Ψr such that
(i) θr = θ¯(Ψr), and
(ii) Ψr = 〈G(·; θr),M a(θr),M o(θr)〉 as defined by (6)-(8).
In other words, the pair (θr,Ψr) constitute an equilibrium if (i) given the market compo-
sition Ψr, it is sequentially rational for each agent to only match with objects whose quality
is above θr, and (ii) the market composition Ψr is consistent with a steady state outcome as
given by (6)-(8) when all agents use the cutoff θr.
Proposition 1
There is a unique random search SME given by (θ∗r ,Ψ
∗
r). The cutoff θ
∗
r satisfies the indifference
condition
θ∗r = (1− γ)
ko
ka
∫ 1
θ∗r
ωdF (ω). (9)
Proof. Fix some market composition Ψ , 〈G,Ma,M o〉. An agent’s optimal cutoff is θ¯(Ψ).
10Specifically, G(·; θˆ) = G(·; `) with `(θ) = 0 if θ < θˆ and `(θ) = 1 if θ > θˆ.
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Hence, the value from random search is given by
U r(Ψ) =
M o
Ma
∫ 1
θ¯(Ψ)
ωdG(ω) + (1− γ)U r(Ψ)
(
M o
Ma
G
(
θ¯(Ψ)
)
+ 1− M
o
Ma
)
=
Mo
Ma
∫ 1
θ¯(Ψ)
ωdG(ω)
γ + M
o
Ma
(1− γ)
(
1−G(θ¯(Ψ))) .
The pair (θr,Ψr) constitutes an SME if θr = θ¯(Ψr) and Ψr = 〈G(·; θr),M a(θr),M o(θr)〉.
Substituting in the market composition expressions in (6)-(8) simplifies the value function to
U r(Ψr) =
ko
ka
∫ 1
θr
ωdF (ω).
Recall that an agent’s cutoff strategy for a given market composition Ψ is characterized by the
indifference condition θ¯(Ψ) = (1− γ)U r(Ψ). Thus, θr = θ¯(Ψr) if, and only if,
θr = (1− γ)ko
ka
∫ 1
θr
ωdF (ω).
Define U : Θ → Θ by U(θ) = ∫ 1
θ
ωdF (ω) which is a continuous and strictly decreasing func-
tion. Hence, there is a unique fixed point to the function (1− γ) ko
ka
U given by θ∗r . The market
composition Ψ∗r is then derived from the cutoff θ
∗
r using (6)-(8)
The characterization of the random search SME cutoff θ∗r is similar to the characterization
of a reservation wage in the McCall search model (McCall, 1970) except the market composition
in the current model is endogenously derived. Intuitively, an agent who searches randomly faces
an inter-temporal trade off; she can either settle for the object to which she is currently paired
or she can continue randomly searching for an object with a higher quality. However, an agent
who declines to match today can continue to search only if she survives into the next period.
Thus, her continuation value of search must be scaled down by her “effective discount factor”
1 − γ. The indifference condition (9) captures the resolution of this inter-temporal trade off.
The cutoff θ∗r , which I refer to as pickiness, is the lowest quality an agent is willing to settle for
today after accounting for her discounted net present value of searching in the future, given by
(1− γ) ko
ka
∫ 1
θ∗r
ωdF (ω).
For a given γ > 0, let θ∗r(γ) be the unique equilibrium cutoff satisfying the indifference
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condition (9). Let U rγ =
θ∗r (γ)
1−γ be the value of random search in the unique SME.
As γ decreases, the effective discount factor increases which in turn increases the discounted
value of search. Thus, agents becomes less willing to settle for low quality objects, i.e., they
become pickier. However, in the aggregate, the pickier the agents are, the more negative
externality they impose on the market. Thus, as γ decreases, the undiscounted value of search
decreases.
Corollary 1
(i) θ∗r(γ) is decreasing in γ, i.e., the agent becomes less picky as γ increases, and
(ii) U rγ is increasing in γ, i.e., the agent’s value of search increases as γ increases.
The unique equilibrium outcome in a random search market is inefficient. The efficient
outcome would be for all agents to match with the first object they are paired to which would
clear the market as quickly as possible (taking into account that there are weakly more agents
than objects) and would yield a higher average payoff of ko
ka
EF [θ]. However, matching to an
object regardless of quality is not sequentially rational for any individual agent. In equilibrium,
an agent instead chooses to match to all types above θ∗r(γ) after taking into account the negative
externalities that other agents impose on the market composition. However, agents do not fully
internalize the negative externalities of their own strategic choices. Hence, the random search
SME is inefficient.
A key drawback of a random search protocol is that agents are forced to pair with positive
probability to objects they would rather avoid. In the following section, I consider a directed
search protocol in which the agents have more ex-ante information that they can use to only
pair with the objects they deem desirable.
1.4. Directed Search Protocol
In a directed search protocol, the search market is further subdivided into a continuum of
sub-markets. A sub-market S(θ) exclusively contains all objects in the market with quality
θ. Given a market composition Ψ , 〈G,Ma,M o〉, sub-market S(θ) has a “mass” of M og(θ)
objects, where g is the density function of G.
Agents can distinguish between all the sub-markets and can choose which sub-market to
search in for a given period. Therefore, each agent knows not only the market composition
but also the quality of an object prior to pairing with it. Let Q(θ) be the fraction of agents
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searching in sub-markets ∪θ′≤θS(θ′). I will refer to Q as the queueing CDF, even though there is
no actual queue in the formal sense of the word. I assume that Q is absolutely continuous with
respect to the steady state market distribution G, i.e., agents cannot enter into a sub-market
that does not exist. Since G is absolutely continuous with respect to F (Lemma 1) which is
itself absolutely continuous, Q admits a density function q. I will refer to Maq(θ) as the queue
length in sub-market S(θ).
In each period, agents choose which sub-markets to enter. The agents and objects within a
sub-market are paired randomly so that the maximal number of pairs is achieved. The long-side
of the sub-market is rationed while the short-side is guaranteed a pairing. Let α(θ;Q,Ψ) =
min
{
Mog(θ)
Maq(θ)
, 1
}
be the probability that an agent in sub-market S(θ) gets paired to an object
in a given period. Similarly, let β(θ;Q,Ψ) = min
{
Maq(θ)
Mog(θ)
, 1
}
be the probability that an object
in sub-market S(θ) gets paired to an agent in a given period.
To simplify exposition, I assume that an agent matches with the first object to which she
is paired. The assumption is without loss of generality as it is never rational for an agent to
enter a sub-market and then reject an object to which she is paired. After all, the agent cannot
get paired to a higher quality object by waiting in the same sub-market and could have done
better by choosing a different sub-market to enter in the first place. As such, I will refer to
α(θ;Q,Ψ) as the agent match probability and β(θ;Q,Ψ) as the object match probability.
Additionally, I assume without loss of generality that agents remain in the first sub-market
they enter. In equilibrium, agents must be indifferent among all of the sub-markets they enter.
Whether or not an agent remains in the first sub-market she enters is irrelevant for her payoff.
Given a queuing CDF Q and a market composition Ψ, let Ud(θ;Q,Ψ) be the agent’s value
from entering sub-market S(θ), given by
Ud(θ;Q,Ψ) = α(θ;Q,Ψ)θ + (1− γ)(1− α(θ;Q,Ψ))Ud(θ;Q,Ψ)
=
α(θ;Q,Ψ)θ
γ + α(θ;Q,Ψ)(1− γ) .
An agent’s decision of which sub-market to enter is affected by Q and Ψ which she takes as a
given. However, both Q and Ψ themselves are affected by the agents’ strategies.
Definition 2 A directed search SME is given by a pair (Qd,Ψd) such that
(i) Qd(θ) =
∫ θ
0
qd(ω)dω for all θ ∈ Θ with Qd(1) = 1,
(ii) qd(θ) > 0 implies θ ∈ arg maxθ′∈Θ Ud(θ′;Qd,Ψd), and
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(iii) Ψd = 〈G
(·; β(·;Qd,Ψd)),M a(β(·;Qd,Ψd)),M o(β(·;Qd,Ψd))〉 as given by (3)-(5).
In other words, the pair (Qd,Ψd) constitute an equilibrium if (i) Qd is an absolutely con-
tinuous queuing CDF, (ii) given agent match probabilities α(·;Qd,Ψd), agents enter only the
sub-markets that maximize their payoff, and (iii) given object match probabilities β(·;Qd,Ψd),
the market composition is characterized by (3)-(5).11
In order to characterize the equilibrium, I make the following observation that simplifies
the problem.
Lemma 2
If (Qd,Ψd) is a directed search SME, there exists a cutoff θd ∈ Int(Θ) , (0, 1) such that
(i) qd(θ) = 0 if θ < θd and qd(θ) > 0 if θ > θd,
(ii) Ud(θ;Qd,Ψd) =

θ for θ ≤ θd
θd for θ ≥ θd
, and
(iii) Ψd = 〈G
(·; θd),M a(θd),M o(θd)〉 as given by (6)-(8).
Proof.
Let (Qd,Ψd) be a directed search SME. By definition, qd(θ) > 0 only if θ ∈ arg maxθ′ Ud(θ′;Qd,Ψd).
Assume qd(θ
′) > 0 = qd(θ′′) for some θ′ < θ′′. Then, α(θ′′;Qd,Ψd) = min
{
Mogd(θ
′′)
Maqd(θ′′)
, 1
}
= 1 and
Ud(θ′′;Qd,Ψd) = θ′′ > θ′ ≥ Ud(θ′;Qd,Ψd), which is a contradiction.
Therefore, there is a cutoff θd such that agents only enter sub-markets above θd. If θd = 1, then
the queueing CDF would be Qd(θ) = 1[θ=1], violating the absolute continuity of Qd. Hence,
θd < 1 and qd(θ) > 0 for all θ > θd.
The sub-markets above θd must be payoff-maximizing: U
d(θ;Qd,Ψd) ≥ Ud(θd;Qd,Ψd) for all
θ > θd. However, 0 ≤ Ud(θ;Qd,Ψd) ≤ θ for all θ ∈ Θ, which implies
0 ≤ Ud(θd;Qd,Ψd) ≤ lim
θ↓θd
Ud(θ;Qd,Ψd) ≤ θd.
11Recall it is WLOG to assume that an agent matches with any object she pairs with in equilibrium. Hence
`(θ) = β(θ;Qd,Ψd).
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Moreover, as the agents must be indifferent to all the sub-markets they enter, Ud(θ′′;Qd,Ψd) =
Ud(θ′;Qd,Ψd) = Ud(θd;Qd,Ψd) for all θ′′ > θ′ > θd.12
If θd = 0, then for all θ ∈ Θ, Ud(θ;Qd,Ψd) = 0 which would require α(θ;Qd,Ψd) = 0. However,
this is only possible if qd(θ) is unbounded for all θ ∈ Θ, once again violating the absolute
continuity of Qd. Hence, θd > 0 and qd(θ) = 0 for all θ < θd.
Furthermore, for all θ < θd, the agent match probability α(θ;Qd,Ψd) = 1 as the queue
length is zero below the cutoff. Hence, Ud(θ;Qd,Ψd) = θ for all θ < θd, which implies
limθ↑θd U
d(θ;Qd,Ψd) = θd. Combining the left and right limits yields U
d(θd;Qd,Ψd) = θd.
To sustain indifference across all the sub-markets above θd, it is necessary that α(θ;Qd,Ψd) < 1
for all θ > θd. Therefore, β(θ;Qd,Ψd) = 1 for all θ > θd. In other words, all objects in sub-
markets S(θ) with θ > θd exit the search market only through a match.
Furthermore, qd(θ) = 0 for all θ < θd implies that β(θ;Qd,Ψd) = min
{
Maqd(θ)
Mogd(θ)
, 1
}
= 0. Thus,
objects in sub-markets S(θ) with θ < θd exit only through death. We can now express the
market composition using (6)-(8) with the cutoff θˆ = θd.
If agents enter a sub-market S(θ′) in equilibrium, then they must enter all sub-markets
containing objects of quality θ > θ′. Otherwise, if the queue length at S(θ′′) for some θ′′ > θ′
were 0, an agent could profitably deviate by entering S(θ′′) and matching to an object of a
higher quality with probability 1.
Yet, agents must be indifferent among all the sub-markets they enter in equilibrium. Conse-
quently, sub-markets that contain objects of higher quality must also have longer queue lengths
(lower agent match probabilities). In other words, for almost all sub-markets the agents enter,
the agents must be on the long-side while the objects are on the short-side.
Combining these two observations, there exists some cutoff θd such that objects with quality
above θd leave the market only through a match while objects with quality below θd leave
the market only through death. The inflow and outflow of objects now closely resemble the
dynamics in the random search model, yielding a similar market composition.
12The equality follows because if Ud(θd;Qd,Ψd) < limθ↓θd U
d(θ;Qd,Ψd) ≤ θd, then agents would strictly prefer
to not enter sub-market S(θd). However, this would mean α(θd;Qd,Ψd) = 1 as the queue length would be
zero, which in turn implies Ud(θd;Qd,Ψd) = θd.
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The following proposition characterizes the direct search SME and shows that it is uniquely
pinned down by the cutoff θd.
Proposition 2
There is a unique directed search SME given by (Q∗d,Ψ
∗
d) where
(i) Ψ∗d = 〈G
(·; θ∗d),M a(θ∗d),M o(θ∗d)〉,
(ii) Q∗d(θ) =

0 if θ ≤ θ∗d∫
θ
θ∗d
ko(ω−(1−γ)θ∗d)(
ka−ko(1−γ)(1−F (θ∗d))
)
θ∗d
dF (ω) for θ ≥ θ∗d
.
The cutoff θ∗d ∈ Θ satisfies the indifference condition
θ∗d =
ko
ka
∫ 1
θ∗d
ωdF (ω). (10)
Proof. Let (Qd,Ψd) be a directed search SME with Ψd , 〈Gd,Mad ,M od 〉. From Lemma 2, there
exists a cutoff θd ∈ Θ such that qd(θ) > (=)0 for all θ > (<)θd, and Ud(θ;Qd,Ψd) = θd for all
θ ≥ θd.
For all θ > θd, U
d(θ;Qd,Ψd) = θd necessitates that α(θ;Qd,Ψd) =
γθd
θ−(1−γ)θd . Additionally,
because agents must be on the long-side of each sub-market above θd, we also have that
α(θ;Qd,Ψd) = min
{
gd(θ)
qd(θ)
ζd, 1
}
= gd(θ)
qd(θ)
ζd where ζd =
Mod
Mad
. Equating these two expressions
for the agent match probability and integrating over the interval [θd, 1] gives
γθd
∫ 1
θd
qd(ω)dω = ζd
∫ 1
θd
ωdGd(ω)− ζd(1− γ)θd(1−Gd(θd)).
Since qd(θ) = 0 for all θ < θd,
∫ 1
θd
qd(ω)dω =
∫
Θ
qd(ω)dω = 1 (because Q is a CDF). Hence, the
expression simplifies to
θd =
ζd
∫ 1
θd
θdGd(θ)
γ + ζd(1− γ)
(
1−Gd(θd)
)
From Lemma 2, the market composition Ψd is consistent with 〈G
(·; θd),M a(θd),M o(θd)〉 as
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given by (6)-(8). Substituting in these expressions for Gd, M
a
d , and M
o
d gives
θd =
ko
ka
∫ 1
θd
ωdF (ω).
Recall, the function U : Θ → Θ defined by U(θ) = ∫ 1
θ
ωdF (ω) is continuous and strictly
decreasing. Hence, there is a unique fixed point to ko
ka
U given by θ∗d. The market composition
Ψ∗d is then pinned down from the cutoff θ
∗
d using (6)-(8). Similarly, the queuing CDF is pinned
down from the agent match probability with
α(θ;Q∗d,Ψ
∗
d) =
M o(θ∗d)g(θ; θ
∗
d)
M a(θ∗d)q
∗
d(θ)
=
γθ∗d
θ − (1− γ)θ∗d
for all θ > θ∗d.
Intuitively, an agent in a directed search market faces similar trade-offs present in the
random search market, i.e., settle for a low quality object versus search for a high quality
object. However, the trade-off under directed search is contemporaneous not inter-temporal.
In particular, the agent can either settle for a low quality object she can get with certainty
today, or she can queue in a congested market today for the possibility of getting a high quality
object. The indifference condition (10) captures the resolution of this contemporaneous trade
off. The cutoff θ∗d is the highest quality the agent can get with certainty while
ko
ka
∫ 1
θ∗d
ωdF (ω) is
her value of directed search from using Q as her searching strategy.
For a slightly different intuition, let us re-write (10) as
kaθ
∗
d = ko
∫ 1
θ∗d
θdF (θ).
The left-hand side is the quality “demanded” by the new agents flowing into the market.
Specifically, there are ka new agents that arrive in each period, and each one seeks to get an
expected payoff of θ∗d. The right-hand side is the total quality “supplied” to the agents. In each
period, high quality objects in sub-markets ∪θ>θ∗dS(θ) are depleted through matches. Hence,
the equality between the left and right-hand side captures the idea that we can deliver a total
expected utility of kaθ
∗
d to the agents only through the newly arriving objects that replenish
the sub-markets ∪θ>θ∗dS(θ).
For a given γ > 0, let θ∗d(γ) be the unique equilibrium cutoff satisfying (10). Let U
d
γ = θ
∗
d(γ)
be the agent’s unique equilibrium value of directed search.
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Interestingly, the cutoff θ∗d(γ) (and thus, the value of directed search) is independent of
the cost of searching. As γ decreases, an agent who failed to get a match today is more
likely to survive into the next period. Hence, she becomes more willing to queue in congested
sub-markets that contain high quality objects. However, the same is true of all agents; as
γ decreases, the mass of agents in the market increases which makes the congestion in the
desirable sub-markets worse. Furthermore, the supply of objects in the desirable sub-markets
∪θ>θ∗d(γ)S(θ) remains unaffected by a change in γ as all of these objects leave the market only
through a match. In other words, while the cost of searching has decreased, the probability of
being rationed a high quality object has also decreased by the same factor. Hence, a decrease
in γ has no effect in a directed search market.13
Corollary 2 The cutoff θ∗d(γ) and the value of directed search U
d
γ are constant in γ.
Similar to the random search protocol, the unique equilibrium outcome under a directed
search protocol is inefficient. Agents could have queued in all the sub-markets and matched
with any quality, clearing the market as much as possible and delivering an average payoff of
ko
ka
EF [θ]. However, an agent queued in a sub-market with low quality objects would have an
incentive to deviate and queue in a sub-market with a high quality objects. In equilibrium,
an agent instead chooses to queue at sub-markets ∪θ>θ∗d(γ)S(θ) after taking into account the
congestion that other agents create. However, agents do not fully internalize the congestion
externalities of their own strategic choices which leads to an inefficient outcome.
In the next section, I take a closer look at the differences between random and directed
search protocol in terms of equilibrium payoffs and welfare.
1.5. Social Welfare Comparison
In the previous sections, I have noted that the equilibrium outcomes of random and directed
search protocols are inefficient. In this section, I show that the inefficiencies created by directed
search are worse than the inefficiencies arising from random search.
In a steady state market with long-lived agents who enter and exit the market in each
period, the appropriate way to measure welfare is by aggregating the equilibrium payoffs of the
13Under random search, there were two additional effects: First, the mass of low quality objects increases as
more of them survive in the search market. Hence, the likelihood of randomly pairing to these low quality
objects increases as γ decreases which lowers U rγ . In directed search, the mass of low quality objects also
increases but this has no effect as the agents can choose to not enter the sub-markets containing the low
quality objects. Second, under random search, the effective discount factor (1 − γ) increases making the
inter-temporal trade-off cheaper for an agent, which in turn made her more picky. In contrast, the trade off
under directed search is contemporaneous and thus does not involve the effective discount factor.
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new agents entering the market.14 Fix the search cost at γ > 0. Since all agents have the same
preferences, social welfare under a random search protocol is given by W rγ = kaU
r
γ . Similarly,
social welfare under a directed search protocol is given by W dγ = kaU
d
γ .
Theorem 1
For any γ > 0, W rγ >W
d
γ . Furthermore, limγ→0W
r
γ −W dγ = 0 .
Proof. Recall the strictly decreasing function U : Θ → Θ defined by U(θ) = ∫ 1
θ
ωdF (ω). The
cutoff θ∗r(γ) is the unique fixed point of (1 − γ) kokaU and θ∗d is the unique fixed point of kokaU.
Thus, for any γ > 0, θ∗r(γ) < θ
∗
d(γ), and
W rγ = ka
θ∗r(γ)
1− γ =︸︷︷︸
by
Proposition 1
koU
(
θ∗r(γ)
)
> koU
(
θ∗d(γ)
)
=︸︷︷︸
by
Proposition 2
kaθ
∗
d(γ) = W
d
γ .
Furthermore, as γ goes to 0, the respective unique fixed points of (1−γ) ko
ka
U and ko
ka
U converge,
i.e. limγ→0 θ∗r(γ)− θ∗d(γ) = 0. Thus, limγ→0W rγ −W dγ = 0.
Figure 1 depicts the characterization of cutoffs and equilibrium expected payoffs under
random and directed search.
θ
1
45 °
U dγ
θ∗d(γ)
U rγ
θ∗r(γ)
Figure 1: The solid blue curve plots ko
ka
U while the dash-dotted red curve plots (1− γ) ko
ka
U.
The congestion externalities generated in directed search markets are seemingly different
from the adverse selection externalities generated by random search. For instance, when search
14See Olszewski and Wolinsky (2016) or Burdett and Menzio (2017) for a discussion.
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is directed, whether or not the market composition over-represents low quality objects does not
matter because the agents can simply avoid pairing with these low quality objects.
In order to better understand the relationship between the two protocols and the ineffi-
ciencies they generate, consider the following hypothetical search market: agents are paired
randomly to objects and forced to match if, and only if, quality is above θˆ ∈ Θ. To simplify,
let us assume that ka = ko which, by Lemma 1, implies that the mass of agents and objects
in the search market are equal. Hence, each agent is guaranteed a pairing with an object of
some quality. Let Ψˆ = 〈G(·; θˆ),M a(θˆ),M o(θˆ)〉 be the resulting market composition as given
in (6)-(8). Let U(θˆ) be an agent’s stationary payoff in this hypothetical market given by
U(θˆ) =
∫ 1
θˆ
ωdG(ω; θˆ) + (1− γ)U(θˆ)G(θˆ; θˆ)
=
∫ 1
θˆ
ωdF (ω),
where the last equality follows from substituting the expression for G(·; θˆ) given by (6).
The pickier the agents are forced to be, the lower their payoff in this hypothetical world.
Intuitively, as the agents are forced to become pickier, the fraction of agents who exit through a
match decreases because the probability of pairing with an object above the cutoff decreases. To
make matters worse, the pickier the agents are, the more adversely selected the market becomes,
making it even less likely than an agent pairs with an object above the cutoff. Formally,
as θˆ increases, G(θˆ; θˆ) also increases (market becomes more adversely selected); this is not
immediately obvious because G(·; θˆ) is non-monotone in θˆ as shown in Figure 2. Furthermore,
as θˆ increases, the fraction of agents leaving through a match, 1−G(θˆ; θˆ), decreases.
Since U(θˆ) is a decreasing function of θˆ, a social planner would set θˆ = 0. However, when
the agents can freely choose their pickiness, the equilibrium outcome is θˆ = θ∗r(γ) > 0 and
U rγ = U(θ∗r(γ)). The cutoff θ∗r(γ) is an agent’s sequentially rational level of pickiness: it is the
lowest quality she is willing to settle for today in order to forsake potentially better matches in
the future after taking into account the equilibrium market composition. The inefficiencies in
a random search market arise precisely because the agents are too picky.
Let us now consider directed search, which we can think of as random search except the
likelihood that an agent is paired to an object of a specific quality is not uniformly random over
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G(θˆ; θˆ)
G(
ˆˆ
θ;
ˆˆ
θ)
ˆˆ
θθˆ
1
Figure 2: The loosely dashed black line is the distribution of new arrivals F = Unif [0, 1], the
dotted blue line is G(·; θˆ), and the solid red line is G(·; ˆˆθ) for ˆˆθ > θˆ.
Θ but determined by the queuing CDF Q∗d and the rationing probability α(·;Q∗d,Ψ∗d). Formally,
U dγ =
∫ 1
θ∗d(γ)
[
ωα(ω;Q∗d,Ψ
∗
d) + (1− γ)U dγ (1− α(ω;Q∗d,Ψ∗d))
]
dQ∗d(ω)
=
∫ 1
θˆ
ωG(ω; θˆ) + (1− γ)U dγG(θˆ; θˆ),
evaluated at θˆ = θ∗d(γ). Thus, the expected payoff in a directed search SME is equivalent to
the expected payoff in the hypothetical search market with θˆ = θ∗d(γ), i.e., U
d
γ = U(θ∗d(γ)).
We can thus compare directed search and random search protocols by focusing on the
hypothetical market. Since U(θˆ) is a decreasing function, U rγ > U dγ if, and only if, θ∗d(γ) > θ∗r(γ).
In other words, random search yields a higher equilibrium payoff and social welfare than directed
search because the agents are less picky when search is random. Consider the simplest case with
γ = 1. When search is random, each agent is willing to match to any object because rejecting
would yield a payoff of 0. Hence, when γ = 1, random search achieves the efficient outcome.
In contrast, when search is directed, each agent is willing to forsake a guaranteed match with a
low quality object for the chance to match with a high quality object with probability less than
one. Hence, 0 = θ∗r(1) < θ
∗
d(1) and directed search yields a less efficient outcome than random
search.
However, as γ decreases, θ∗r(γ) increases (Corollary 1) while θ
∗
d(γ) remains constant (Corol-
lary 2). Yet, Theorem 1 implies that the agents are always less picky when search is random.
Why?
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When search is random, an agent’s pickiness is characterized by the fixed point of (1−γ)U,
the inter-temporal trade-off between her current (and therefore guaranteed) match and her
value from searching for potentially better matches in the future. In contrast, when search is
directed, an agent’s pickiness is characterized by the fixed point of U, the contemporaneous
trade-off between a guaranteed match today and her value from searching for potentially better
matches today. As an agent facing the former trade-off has to discount her value of search by
1 − γ, she is always less picky when search is random. Consequently, random search yields a
higher equilibrium payoff than directed search.
2. Search with Ex-post Transfers
This section extends the basic search model with non-transferable utility in two dimensions:
first, I consider a model where both agents and objects are strategic. Second, I allow for ex-
post transfers. However, the terminology of agents and objects is cumbersome when both are
strategic. Henceforth, I consider a labor market framework in which firms (she) play the role
of agents, and workers (he) play the role of objects. The exposition stays as close as possible
to the previous section.
2.1. Setup
In each period, the firms on one side of the search market are paired to the workers on the
other side. The workers differ in the level of output they produce. In particular, a worker of
productivity type θ ∈ Θ can produce θ units of output.
Once a firm pairs to a worker, the firm observes the worker’s type θ. If both agree to match
at a wage of w ∈ R, then both exit the market and the firm gets a payoff of θ − w while the
worker gets w. If at least one of them declines to match, they both return to the search market.
The inflow and outflow of firms and workers follows the same dynamics as the respective inflow
and outflow of agents and objects in the basic model with non-transferable utility.
2.2. Random Search Protocol with Ex-post Transfers
Under a random search protocol, a firm observes a worker’s productivity only after being
paired. Prior to a pairing, a firm only knows the prevailing endogenously determined market
composition Ψ , 〈G,Ma,M o〉 where G is the productivity distribution of the workers in the
market, Ma is the total mass of firms in the market, and M o is the total mass of workers in the
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market. In each period, firms and workers are randomly paired so that the maximal number of
pairs is achieved. As there are (weakly) more firms than workers, each worker gets paired to a
single firm with probability 1 whereas each firm gets paired to a single worker with probability
M o/Ma.
Once a firm and a worker are paired, the firm observes the worker’s productivity θ. If
the pair agree to match, they bargain over wages and exit the market. If either the firm or
the worker decline to match, both return to the market and search again next period with
probability 1− γ.
For a given market composition Ψ, let U r(Ψ) be a firm’s value from searching randomly.
Similarly, let Vr(θ; Ψ) be the value of random search for a worker with productivity θ ∈ Θ.
I assume that transfers are determined ex-post using a Nash bargaining solution. Hence, the
bargained wage between a firm and a type θ worker is
wr(θ; Ψ) = arg max
w∈R
(
θ − w − (1− γ)U r(Ψ)
)ρ(
w − (1− γ)Vr(θ; Ψ)
)1−ρ
where ρ ∈ (0, 1) is the bargaining power of firms. In particular,
wr(θ; Ψ) = (1− ρ)
(
θ − (1− γ)U r(Ψ)
)
+ ρ(1− γ)Vr(θ; Ψ). (11)
Suppose a worker of type θ ∈ Θ leaves the market only though a match with a firm. Then,
Vr(θ; Ψ) = wr(θ; Ψ) =
(1− ρ)
(
θ − (1− γ)U r(Ψ)
)
1− ρ(1− γ) (12)
where the second equality follows from (11). It must be sequentially rational for a worker of
type θ to match with a firm, i.e., wr(θ; Ψ) ≥ (1 − γ)Vr(θ; Ψ). It must also be sequentially
rational for a firm to match with a worker of type θ, i.e., θ − wr(θ; Ψ) ≥ (1− γ)U r(Ψ). Using
the expression in (12) and the sequential rationality inequalities, a worker of type θ exists the
market only through a match if a non-negative surplus condition θ ≥ (1 − γ)U r(Ψ) holds.
Furthermore, it is straightforward to check that if θ > (1 − γ)U r(Ψ), the worker leaves only
through a match in equilibrium.
Similarly, suppose a worker of type θ ∈ Θ leaves the market only though death. Then,
Vr(θ; Ψ) = 0. It must be sequentially rational for either firms or workers to decline to match.
A worker of type θ declines to match with a firm if wr(θ; Ψ) ≤ 0. A firm declines to match
with a worker of type θ if θ − wr(θ; Ψ) ≤ (1 − γ)U r(Ψ). Using the expression in (11) and the
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sequential rationality inequalities, we get a non-positive surplus condition θ ≤ (1 − γ)U r(Ψ).
Furthermore, it is straightforward to check that if θ < (1 − γ)U r(Ψ), the worker leaves only
through death in equilibrium.
Therefore, there exists a cutoff θ¯(Ψ) = (1− γ)U r(Ψ) such that all workers of type θ > θ¯(Ψ)
leave the market through a match with a firm while all workers of type θ < θ¯(Ψ) leave the
market through death.
Definition 3 A random search SME with transfers is given by a cutoff θr ∈ Θ and a market
composition Ψr such that
(i) θr = θ¯(Ψr), and
(ii) Ψr = 〈G(·; θr),M a(θr),M o(θr)〉 as defined by (6)-(8).
In other words, a stationary equilibrium for random search with transfers is characterized
by a pair (θr,Ψr) such that (i) given the market composition Ψr, it is sequentially rational for
each firm to match with a worker of type θ > θr at wage
(1−ρ)(θ−θr)
1−ρ(1−γ) (from (12)) and to decline
to match with a worker of type θ < θr, and (ii) the market composition Ψr is consistent with
a steady state outcome when all firms use the cutoff θr.
Proposition 3
There is a unique random search SME with transfers given by (θ∗∗r ,Ψ
∗∗
r ). The cutoff θ
∗∗
r satisfies
the indifference condition
θ∗∗r =
koργ(1− γ)
ka(1− ρ(1− γ))− ko(1− γ)(1− ρ)(1− F (θ∗∗r ))
∫ 1
θ∗∗r
ωdF (ω). (13)
Proof. Fix some market composition Ψ , 〈G,Ma,M o〉. Given the firm’s sequential rational
cutoff is θ¯(Ψ), her value from random search is given by
U r(Ψ) =M
o
Ma
∫ 1
θ¯(Ψ)
ω − wr(ω; Ψ)dG(ω) +
(
1− M
o
Ma
+
M o
Ma
G(θ¯(Ψ))
)
(1− γ)U r(Ψ)
=
M o
Ma
∫ 1
θ¯(Ψ)
ωργ + (1− ρ)(1− γ)U r(Ψ)
1− ρ(1− γ) dG(ω) +
(
1− M
o
Ma
+
M o
Ma
G(θ¯(Ψ))
)
(1− γ)U r(Ψ)
=
ξ
∫ 1
θ¯(Ψ)
ωdG(ω)
γ + (1− γ)ξ(1−G(θ¯(Ψ))) ,
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where ξ = M
o
Ma
(
ργ
1−ρ(1−γ)
)
. The first equality follows from substituting wr by the expression in
(12).
The pair (θr,Ψr) constitutes an SME if θr = θ¯(Ψr) and Ψr = 〈G(·; θr),M a(θr),M o(θr)〉.
Substituting in the market composition expressions in (6)-(8) simplifies the value function to
U r(Ψr) = koργ
ka(1− ρ(1− γ))− ko(1− γ)(1− ρ)(1− F (θr))
∫ 1
θr
ωdF (ω).
Since the firm’s cutoff strategy for a given market composition Ψ is characterized by the indif-
ference condition θ¯(Ψ) = (1− γ)U r(Ψ),
θr =
koργ(1− γ)
ka(1− ρ(1− γ))− ko(1− γ)(1− ρ)(1− F (θr))
∫ 1
θr
ωdF (ω).
Recall the function U(θ) =
∫ 1
θ
ωdF (ω) which is continuous and strictly decreasing in θ. Let
H : Θ→ (0, 1] be given by
H(θ) =
koγ
ka(1− ρ(1− γ))− ko(1− γ)(1− ρ)(1− F (θ))
which is also a continuous and strictly decreasing function of θ. Hence, there is a unique fixed
point to the function (1− γ)ρH · U given by θ∗∗r . The market composition Ψ∗∗r is then derived
from the cutoff θ∗∗r using (6)-(8)
Similar to the case of random search with non-transferable utility, a firm who searches
randomly faces an inter-temporal trade off; she can either settle for a worker she is currently
paired to or she can continue randomly searching for a worker with a higher productivity.
However, a firm who declines to match today can continue to search only if she survives into
the next period. Thus, her continuation value of search must be discounted by 1 − γ. The
indifference condition (13) captures the resolution of this inter-temporal trade off. The cutoff
θ∗∗r is the lowest productivity worker that firms are willing to hire.
For a given (ρ, γ) ∈ (0, 1)2, let θ∗∗r (ρ, γ) be the unique equilibrium cutoff satisfying the
indifference condition (13). Let U rρ,γ = θ
∗∗
r (ρ,γ)
1−γ be the firm’s unique equilibrium value of random
search.
As a firm’s bargaining power increases, she extracts more of the surplus generated by a
match. In particular, her ex-post payoff becomes more and more sensitive to the worker’s
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productivity. Thus, as ρ increases, the firms become more picky. In the limit when the firms
have all the bargaining power, the workers are effectively reduced into the non-strategic objects
from the basic model. The firms extract all the surplus and the equilibrium outcomes under
transferable and non-transferable utility coincide.
Corollary 3 The cutoff θ∗∗r (ρ, γ) and the firms’ value of random search U rρ,γ are increasing in
ρ. Furthermore, limρ→1 θ∗∗r (ρ, γ) = θ
∗
r(γ) and limρ→1U rρ,γ = U rγ .
Unlike the case of non-transferable utility, the comparative statics with respect to γ is
ambiguous and non-monotone. Under Nash bargaining, the discounted continuation values of
the players are the disagreement points. As γ decreases, the firms disagreement point improves
but the same is true for the workers. Which party comes out on top depends on the relative
bargaining power of the players.
Nonetheless, if the firms don’t have full bargaining power, the random search equilibrium
outcome converges to a competitive market outcome as the cost of searching vanishes; in the
limit, firms hire all workers at wages wr(θ) = θ and the outcome is efficient. This observa-
tion is consistent with Lauermann (2013) who shows more generally that outcomes in random
search and bargaining games converge to competitive market outcomes if, and only if, there is
competitive pressure in the search market. One such competitive pressure is that both sides of
the market have bargaining power.15 In contrast, if the firms have full bargaining power, the
outcome of the random search market with transfers converges to the inefficient directed search
outcome with non-transferable utility as the search cost vanishes.
Corollary 4 As γ → 0, the random search SME with transfers converges to a competitive
market outcome if, and only if, ρ < 1.
Similar to a random search market with non-transferable utility, the unique equilibrium
outcome in a random search market with transferable utility is inefficient. The efficient outcome
would be for all firms to match with any type of worker. However, matching with all worker
types is not sequentially rational for any single firm. In equilibrium, a firm instead chooses to
match to all types above θ∗∗r (ρ, γ) after taking into account the negative externalities that other
firms impose on the market composition. However, firms do not fully internalize the negative
externalities of their own strategic choices. Furthermore, since bargaining is over the ex-post
surplus, wages also do not fully internalize the negative externalities. Hence, the random search
SME with transfers is also inefficient.
15Other forms of competitive pressure are asymmetric information with noisy signals, and one firm bargaining
with multiple workers simultaneously.
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2.3. Directed Search Protocol with Ex-post Transfers
Similar to the basic model, the search market is further subdivided into a continuum of sub-
markets. A sub-market S(θ) exclusively contains all workers in the market with productivity θ.
Firms can distinguish between all the sub-markets and can choose which sub-market to search
in for a given period. For instance, we can think of S(θ) as a university that has a reputation
of producing workers of type θ. Firms can then choose in which universities they recruit for
employees.
Let Q be the absolutely continuous queuing CDF with density function q. Given a market
composition Ψ = 〈G,Ma,M o〉, sub-market S(θ) has a “mass” of M og(θ) workers and a queue
length of Maq(θ) firms.
In each period, firms and workers within a sub-market are paired randomly so that the
maximal number of pairs is achieved. Let α(θ;Q,Ψ) = min
{
Mog(θ)
Maq(θ)
, 1
}
be the firm match
probability, the probability that a firm in sub-market S(θ) gets a match in a given period.
Similarly, let β(θ;Q,Ψ) = min
{
Maq(θ)
Mog(θ)
, 1
}
be the worker match probability, the probability
that a worker in sub-market S(θ) gets matched in a given period.
For a given market composition Ψ and queuing CDF Q, let Ud(θ;Q,Ψ) be a firm’s value
from directing her search to sub-market S(θ). Similarly, let Vd(θ;Q,Ψ) be the value function
for a worker in sub-market S(θ).
On the equilibrium path where θ ∈ Supp(q),16 a firm and worker determine wages using a
Nash bargaining solution concept. Let
wd(θ;Q,Ψ) = (1− ρ)
(
θ − (1− γ)Ud(θ;Q,Ψ)
)
+ ρ(1− γ)Vd(θ;Q,Ψ) (14)
be the on-path Nash bargaining solution between a firm and a type θ worker. The value of
search for a worker in an on-path sub-market S(θ) can then be written as
Vd(θ;Q,Ψ) =β(θ;Q,Ψ)wd(θ;Q,Ψ) + (1− β(θ;Q,Ψ))(1− γ)Vd(θ;Q,Ψ)
=
β(θ;Q,Ψ)(1− ρ)
(
θ − (1− γ)Ud(θ;Q,Ψ)
)
γ + β(θ;Q,Ψ)(1− γ)(1− ρ) . (15)
16Supp(q) is the support of the density q, i.e., {θ : q(θ) > 0}. Hence, Supp(q) are the sub-markets firms enter.
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Similarly, the value of search for a firm in an on-path sub-market S(θ) can be written as
Ud(θ;Q,Ψ) =α(θ;Q,Ψ)(θ − wd(θ;Q,Ψ)) + (1− α(θ;Q,Ψ))(1− γ)Ud(θ;Q,Ψ)
=
ρα(θ;Q,Ψ)θ
γ + (1− γ)
(
ρα(θ;Q,Ψ) + (1− ρ)β(θ;Q,Ψ)
) . (16)
Off the equilibrium path where θ /∈ Supp(q), a worker’s payoff is V(θ;Q,Ψ) = 0. If a firm
deviates to an off-path sub-market, then she is guaranteed an immediate match and gets a
deviation payoff of Ud(θ;Q,Ψ) = θ − wd(θ;Q,Ψ). However, I do not require off-path wages to
also be solutions to a Nash bargaining problem. Instead, I assume that wages are continuous
(both on and off-path), i.e., I focus on continuous equilibria in which off-path wages are limit
points of on-path wages. Furthermore, I assume that off-path wages do not change too fast.
Assumption 1
(i) wd(θ;Q,Ψ) is continuous in θ.
(ii) For all θ ∈ Supp(q), wd, Vd, and Ud are given by (14), (15), and (16) respectively.
(iii) For all θ′, θ′′ /∈ Supp(q), |wd(θ′;Q,Ψ)− wd(θ′′;Q,Ψ)| < |θ′ − θ′′|.
In Online Appendix B, I relax this assumption and characterize all equilibrium outcomes
when both on and off-path wages are determined by Nash bargaining. However, the latter
approach makes the problem less tractable.17
Definition 4 A directed search SME with transfers is given by a pair (Qd,Ψd) such that there
exists a wage function wd(·;Qd,Ψd) : Θ→ R that satisfies Assumption 1 and
(i) Qd(θ) =
∫ θ
0
qd(ω)dω for all θ ∈ Θ with Qd(1) = 1,
17When wages are determined by Nash bargaining everywhere, the wages indirectly depend on the worker match
probability β(·;Q,Ψ). Suppose firms only enter sub-markets above a cutoff θ′ in equilibrium. Then for all
θ in a left neighborhood of θ′, S(θ) is off-path and thus β(θ;Q,Ψ) = 0. If β(·;Q,Ψ) discretely jumps up in
a right neighborhood of θ′, then so do the Nash bargaining wages, i.e., wd(θ′ − ;Q,Ψ)  wd(θ′ + ;Q,Ψ)
for some  > 0 small enough. However, by entering S(θ′ + ) instead of S(θ′ − ), firms get a marginal gain
in productivity but a discrete loss in wages which makes deviating to S(θ′ − ) profitable. To prevent such
downward deviations, the worker match probability cannot jump at the cutoff. Hence, there is some interval
(θ′, θ′′) over which firms are rationed and workers are on the long side. This however complicates the market
composition which would no longer be piecewise linear. Nonetheless, I show that an equilibrium exists and
derive a general characterization for it. Furthermore, I show that if firm bargaining power is high enough, or
if search is costly enough, the main result of this section continues to hold.
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(ii) qd(θ) > 0 if and only if θ ∈ arg maxθ′∈Θ Ud(θ′;Qd,Ψd), and
(iii) Ψd = 〈G
(·; β(·;Qd,Ψd)),M a(β(·;Qd,Ψd)),M o(β(·;Qd,Ψd))〉 as given by (3)-(5).
In other words, a stationary equilibrium for directed search with transfers is characterized
by a pair (Qd,Ψd) such that there exists a wage function w
d which (i) given (Qd,Ψd), w
d is
derived by Nash bargaining on-path and has nice smoothness properties off-path, (ii) given wd,
the queueing CDF Qd is consistent with the firms entering only the sub-markets that maximize
their profits, and (iii) the market composition Ψd is consistent with a steady state outcome
given by (3)-(5).
Proposition 4
Under Assumption 1, there exists a directed search SME given by (Q∗∗d ,Ψ
∗∗
d ) where
(i) Ψ∗∗d = 〈G
(·; θ∗∗d ),M a(θ∗∗d ),M o(θ∗∗d )〉,
(ii) Q∗∗d (θ) =

0 if θ ≤ θ∗∗d∫
θ
θ∗∗d
koγ(ω−ρ(1−γ)θ∗∗d )(
ka−ko(1−γ)(1−F (θ∗∗d ))
)
θ∗∗d (1−ρ(1−γ))
dF (ω) for θ ≥ θ∗∗d
,
(iii) Ud(θ;Q∗∗d ,Ψ∗∗d ) = ρθ∗∗d ,∀θ ≥ θ∗∗d
The cutoff θ∗∗d ∈ Θ is characterized by
θ∗∗d =
koγ
ka(1− ρ(1− γ))− ko(1− γ)(1− ρ)(1− F (θ∗∗d ))
∫ 1
θ∗∗d
ωdF (ω). (17)
Proof. If the pair (Qd,Ψd) constitute a directed search SME, there exists a cutoff θd ∈ Θ
such that firms only enter sub-markets S(θ) with θ > θd. I will look for equilibrium where
β(θ;Qd,Ψd) = 1 for all θ > θd. Hence, in an on-path sub-market S(θ), the firm’s payoff is given
by
Ud(θ;Q,Ψ) = ρα(θ;Q,Ψ)θ
γ + (1− γ)
(
ρα(θ;Q,Ψ) + 1− ρ
) ≤ ρθ,
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and, the wage is given by
wd(θ;Q,Ψ) =
θ(1− ρ)
γ + (1− γ)(ρα(θ;Qd,Ψd) + 1− ρ) .
Off-path, a firm’s payoff by entering a sub-market S(θ) with θ < θd is given by Ud(θ;Qd,Ψd) =
θ − wd(θ;Qd,Ψd) which is increasing in θ given Assumption 1. Furthermore, by the continuity
of wages, limθ↑θd Ud(θ;Qd,Ψd) = θd − wd(θd;Qd,Ψd).
Suppose limθ↓θd α(θ;Qd,Ψd) = α¯ < 1. Then the limit point of a firm’s on-path payoff is
lim
θ↓θd
Ud(θ;Q,Ψ) = ρα¯θd
γ + (1− γ)
(
ρα¯ + 1− ρ
) .
In contrast, the limit point of the firm’s off-path payoff is given by
lim
θ↑θd
Ud(θ;Q,Ψ) = θd−wd(θd;Qd,Ψd) = θd− θd(1− ρ)
γ + (1− γ)(ρα¯ + 1− ρ) >
ρα¯θd
γ + (1− γ)
(
ρα¯ + 1− ρ
) ,
which implies that for  > 0 small enough, the firms would strictly prefer to deviate to an
off-path sub-market S(θ) with θ ∈ (θd − , θd). Hence, α¯ = 1 and
lim
θ↑θd
Ud(θ;Qd,Ψd) = ρθd = lim
θ↓θd
Ud(θ;Qd,Ψd).
As the firms must be indifferent among all the sub-markets they enter, Ud(θ′′;Qd,Ψd) =
Ud(θ′;Qd,Ψd) for all θ′′ > θ′ > θd. Thus, Ud(θ;Qd,Ψd) = ρθd for all θ ≥ θd.
The indifference condition Ud(θ;Qd,Ψd) = ρθd for all θ > θd necessitates that α(θ;Qd,Ψd) =
θd(1−ρ(1−γ))
θ−ρ(1−γ)θd for all θ > θd. Because α(θ;Qd,Ψd) < 1 for all θ > θd, firms must be on the long-side
of each sub-market above the cutoff. By definition, we also have that α(θ;Qd,Ψd) =
gd(θ)
qd(θ)
ζd for
all θ > θd, where ζd =
Mod
Mad
. Equating these two expressions for the firm match probability and
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integrating over the interval [θd, 1] gives
θd(1− ρ(1− γ))
∫ 1
θd
qd(θ)dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
= ζd
∫ 1
θd
θdGd(θ)− ζdρ(1− γ)θd(1−Gd(θd))
⇔ θd =
ζd
∫ 1
θd
θdGd(θ)
1− ρ(1− γ) + ζdρ(1− γ)
(
1−Gd(θd)
) .
The market composition Ψd must be consistent with 〈G
(·; θd),M a(θd),M o(θd)〉 as given by
(6)-(8). Substituting in these expressions for Gd, M
a
d , and M
o
d gives
θd =
koγ
ka(1− ρ(1− γ))− ko(1− γ)(1− ρ)(1− F (θd))
∫ 1
θd
ωdF (ω).
Recall the functions U : Θ → Θ and H : Θ → (0, 1] which are both continuous and strictly
decreasing in θ. Hence, there is a unique fixed point to the function H · U given by θ∗∗d .
The market composition Ψ∗∗d is then derived from the cutoff θ
∗∗
d using (6)-(8). Similarly, the
queueing CDF is pinned down from the agent match probability with
α(θ;Q∗∗d ,Ψ
∗∗
d ) =
M o(θ∗∗d )g(θ; θ
∗∗
d )
M a(θ∗∗d )q
∗∗
d (θ)
=
θ∗∗d (1− ρ(1− γ))
θ − ρ(1− γ)θ∗∗d
for all θ > θ∗∗d .
Remark 1 Proposition 4 characterizes an equilibrium outcome when all on-path sub-markets
are congested (more firms than workers). It may be possible that there is another equilibrium
in which some of the intermediate productivity sub-markets are in fact thin (more workers than
firms). I explore such an equilibrium outcome when Assumption 1 is relaxed (in the online
appendix Mekonnen (2018)).
A firm faces a contemporaneous trade off; she can either settle for a worker she can match
to without waiting or she can queue in a congested sub-market for the possibility of matching
with a more productive worker. The indifference condition (17) captures the resolution of this
contemporaneous trade off. The cutoff θ∗∗d is the highest productivity worker that firms can get
without waiting in a congested sub-market.
For a given (ρ, γ) ∈ (0, 1)2, let θ∗∗d (ρ, γ) be the equilibrium cutoff satisfying the indifference
condition (17). Let Udρ,γ = ρθ∗∗d (ρ, γ) be the firm’s equilibrium payoff of directed search.
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As a firm’s bargaining power increases, she extracts more of the surplus generated by a
successful match. Thus, as ρ increases, the firms become more picky. In the limit when the
firms have all the bargaining power, the equilibrium outcomes under transferable and non-
transferable utility coincide.
Corollary 5 The cutoff θ∗∗d (ρ, γ) and the firms’ value of directed search Udρ,γ are increasing
in ρ. Furthermore, limρ→1 θ∗∗d (ρ, γ) = θ
∗
d(γ) and limρ→1Udρ,γ = U dγ .
Unlike the case of non-transferable utility, the comparative statics with respect to γ is no
longer constant when ρ < 1. The mass of productive workers with θ > θ∗∗d is unaffected by a
decrease in γ as all these workers exit the market only through successful matches. However,
more of the unmatched firms survive into the subsequent periods, making the congestion worse.
Furthermore, a decrease in γ improves the discounted continuation value of the workers. Thus,
when the productive workers have some bargaining power, they demand higher wages not only
because they are relatively rarer but also because they have a better disagreement point.
As a result, if the firms don’t have full bargaining power, they become more willing to settle
for low productivity workers as the cost of searching decreases. Similar to random search with
transfers, the directed search SME with transfers converges to a competitive market outcome
when the cost of searching vanishes; in the limit, firms enter all sub-markets and hire all workers
at wages wd(θ) = θ which is efficient.
Corollary 6 For any ρ < 1, the cutoff θ∗∗d (ρ, γ) and the firms’ value of directed search Udρ,γ
are increasing in γ. Furthermore, as γ → 0, the directed search SME with transfers converges
to a competitive market outcome if, and only if, ρ < 1.
Unsurprisingly, the equilibrium outcome in a Proposition 4 is inefficient. The efficient out-
come would be for all firms to queue in all sub-markets which is not optimal for any single firm.
In equilibrium, a firm instead chooses to queue at any sub-market above θ∗∗d (ρ, γ) after taking
into account the congestion externalities that other firms impose on the market. However, firms
do not fully internalize the negative externalities of their own strategic choices. Furthermore,
the Nash bargaining protocol only splits the ex-post surplus once a match forms; it does not
take into account the search externalities that arise prior to the formation of a match. Hence,
the directed search SME with transfers is inefficient.
The result stands in stark contrast to the vast literature on directed search with posted
wages. Posted wages provide an ex-ante mechanism for one side of the market to internalize the
search frictions. However, the ability to post wages must be complemented with commitment
34
power. If the posted wages are non-binding, then one side of the market may find it profitable to
renege and propose new wages, undermining the efficiency properties of directed search markets
with posted prices.
2.4. Social Welfare Comparison with Ex-post Transfers
Similar to the case of non-transferable utility, random and directed search markets with ex-post
transfers lead to inefficient equilibrium outcomes. I conclude this section by showing that the
inefficiencies created by directed search are worse than the inefficiencies arising from random
search.18 The intuition is precisely the same as the one for non-transferable utility.
Let i = r, d be an index for random and directed respectively. As in the basic model,
welfare is measured by the aggregate value of search for the new entrants. For given parameters
(ρ, γ) ∈ (0, 1)2, let Vrρ,γ(θ) be the type θ worker’s value of random search derived from (12).
Similarly, let Vdρ,γ(θ) be the type θ worker’s value of directed search derived from (15). The
social welfare under protocol i = r, d is then given by
W iρ,γ =kaU iρ,γ + ko
∫ 1
θ∗∗i (ρ,γ)
V iρ,γ(ω)dF (ω)
=ko
∫ 1
θ∗∗i (ρ,γ)
ωdF (ω).
Theorem 2
For any (ρ, γ) ∈ (0, 1]2, U rρ,γ > Udρ,γ, and Wrρ,γ >Wdρ,γ. Furthermore, limγ→0U rρ,γ − Udρ,γ = 0
and limγ→0Wrρ,γ −Wdρ,γ = 0.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1.
3. Conclusion
This paper provides a tractable and parsimonious search model to study how changes in the
search protocol or the timing of information affect equilibrium outcomes and welfare. The
overall theme of the paper is that when agents search for scarce resources of heterogeneous
quality, giving agents more flexibility in how they search or more ex-ante information could
be detrimental. Specifically, I show that when there are more agents than resources, directed
18Reader should be aware that the welfare comparisons in this section are not as strong as those of the basic
model since the directed search SME with transfers characterized in Proposition 4 is not unique.
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search creates worse inefficiencies and leads to lower equilibrium payoffs than random search.
While the main result of the paper is framed in a search model with non-transferable utility,
I also show that the same conclusions extend into a search model when utility is transferable
through Nash bargaining on the equilibrium path.
In the Online Appendix (Mekonnen, 2018), I show that the main insights in this paper are
robust to changes in the assumptions made in the model. Specifically, I show that the main
result continues to hold for some parameters of the model that violate the scarcity assumption.
Additionally, adding a small amount of friction to the matching technology, as is common in
the macroeconomics and search literature, does not change the main result.
I also provide a generalization of the model in which objects are both vertically differentiated
by quality and horizontally differentiated by attributes, and agents have heterogeneous tastes
over the horizontal attributes while also caring about the quality. I show that directed search
based only on horizontal attributes is always better than both random search and directed
search based on both horizontal attributes and quality. Additionally, I show that if the amount
of taste heterogeneity in the market is small, random search is better than directed search based
on both horizontal attributes and quality.
Finally, I also consider a partially directed search protocol based on a finite partition of the
quality space, and show that welfare is higher under the random search protocol than under a
partially directed search protocol for any finite partition.
Of course, there are other search protocols than just random and directed search. For
example, we could allow an agent to direct her search for the first T periods after she enters the
market and force her to search randomly thereafter. We could also introduce priority lotteries
or formal queues into the market. An interesting avenue for future work would be to adopt a
market design approach and characterize the welfare-maximizing search protocol.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
Proof. Suppose there is a solution Ψ = 〈G(·; `),M a(`),M o(`)〉 to the system of functional
equations (1)-(2). I will use the necessary conditions associated with such a solution to derive
the market composition.
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Fix γ > 0. Since ` is a probability, for any θ′ < θ′′,
M o(`)γ
(
G(θ′′; `)−G(θ′; `)
)
≤M o(`)
∫ θ′′
θ′
(
(1− `(ω))γ + `(ω)
)
dG(ω; β)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ko
(
F (θ′′)−F (θ′)
)
by (1)
≤M o(`)
(
G(θ′′; `)−G(θ′; `)
)
Evaluating the above inequalities at θ′ = 0 and θ′′ = 1 gives ko ≤M o(`) ≤ koγ−1. Additionally,
for any θ′ < θ′′,
γ
(
F (θ′′)− F (θ′)) ≤ G(θ′′; `)−G(θ′; `) ≤ γ−1(F (θ′′)− F (θ′)).
Thus, if a steady state market composition exists, G(·; `) is necessarily absolutely continuous
with respect to F , which is itself absolutely continuous. Hence, G(·; `) must have a density
function g(·; `), and 0 < γf ≤ g(θ; `) ≤ γ−1f¯ <∞ for almost all θ ∈ Θ.
Furthermore, from (1), we must have M o(`) = koEG[`+ (1− `)γ]−1 and
g(θ; `) =
ko
M o(`)
(
f(θ)
`(θ) + γ(1− `(θ))
)
= EG[`+ (1− `)γ]
(
f(θ)
`(θ) + γ(1− `(θ))
)
for almost all θ ∈ Θ. Thus,
G(θ; `) = EG[`+ (1− `)γ]
∫ θ
0
1
`(ω) + γ(1− `(ω))dF (ω).
However,G(1; `) = 1 which is true only if EG[`+(1−`)γ] = EF [
(
`+(1−`)γ)−1]−1. Hence,G(·; `)
and M o(`) are characterized by (3) and (4). Finally, from (2), we can express M a(`)−M o(`)
as
γ−1
[
ka − (1− γ)M o(`)
∫
Θ
`(ω)dG(ω; `)−M o(`)γ
]
= γ−1[ka − ko],
where the last equality follows from (1). Thus, M a(`) is characterized by (5).
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A. Basic Search Model: Extensions
A.1. Frictional Search
One of the assumptions in the basic model of Section 1 is that search is frictionless. Specifically,
I assumed that if there is a mass M o of objects and a mass Ma of agents in a (sub)market, then
each object gets paired to an agent with probability min
{
Ma
Mo
, 1
}
while each agent gets paired
to an object with probability min
{
Mo
Ma
, 1
}
.
In this section of the appendix, I first characterize the unique random and directed search
SMEs for a class of frictional pairing technologies. I then show that the main result of Theorem 1
continues to hold when search frictions are small.
Define t , Ma
Mo
as the “market tightness.” Let x : R+ → [0, 1] be a pairing technology such
that given a market tightness t, an object gets paired with probability x(t) while an agent gets
paired with probability x(t)
t
. Let X be the class of pairing technologies that satisfy19
1. Regularity: x(t) is continuous, (weakly) increasing, and (weakly) concave in t,
2. Feasibility: x(t) ≤ min{t, 1}, and
3. Limits: x(0) = 0, limt→∞ x(t) = 1, and limt→0
x(t)
t
= 1.
This class of matching technologies is common in the labor/macroeconomic search literature.20
Here are a few examples of pairing technologies in X .
a. Frictionless pairing technologies: x(t) = min{t, 1},
b. CES pairing technologies: x(t) =
(
1 + t
−1
φ
)−φ
for φ > 0, and
c. Urn ball/exponential pairing: x(t) = t
(
1− exp(−φ
t
)
)
for 0 < φ ≤ 1.
A.1.1. Frictional Random Search Protocol
Consider a pairing technology x ∈ X , a market composition Ψ = 〈G,Ma,M o〉, and some
market tightness t = Ma/M o. The value of random search is given by
U r(Ψ) =
x(t)
t
∫
Θ
max{θ, (1− γ)U r(Ψ)}dG(θ) +
(
1− x(t)
t
)
(1− γ)U r(Ψ).
19The mass of paired objects and paired agents must be the same. If y(t) is the probability that an agent
gets paired, Mox(t) = May(t) =⇒ y(t) = x(t)t . As x(t) ≤ min{t, 1}, x(t)t is a well-defined probability.
Additionally, concavity of x implies x(t)t is a decreasing function.
20See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) and Rogerson et al. (2005) for a survey.
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The agents’ optimal strategy is still given by some cutoff θ¯(Ψ) = (1 − γ)U r(Ψ) such that an
agent matches to any object of quality θ > θ¯(Ψ) and rejects any object of quality θ < θ¯(Ψ).
The above expression takes the market composition as exogenous. However, the market
composition endogenously depends on the agents’ strategy. Given some cutoff strategy θˆ ∈ Θ
and market tightness t, the market composition Ψ = 〈G(·; `),M a(`),M o(`)〉 can be derived
from Lemma 1 with `(θ) = 1[θ>θˆ]x(t).
21 It is important to note that the market tightness is itself
an endogenous variable and must be consistent with the market composition in equilibrium.
Definition A.1 Given a pairing technology x ∈ X , a random search SME is given by a cutoff
θr ∈ Θ, a market composition Ψr, and a market tightness tr > 0 such that
(i) Ψr = 〈G(·; `),M a(`),M o(`)〉 is given by (3)-(5) with `(θ) = 1[θ>θr]x(tr),
(ii) θr = θ¯(Ψr), and
(iii) tr =
Ma(`)
Mo(`)
.
To get some intuition for Definition A.1, consider the following iterative process: Take some
arbitrary Ψ1 and compute t1. The agents optimally use the cutoff strategy θ1 = θ¯(Ψ1). The
cutoff strategy θ1 and the market tightness t1 are used to derive a new market composition
Ψ2 = 〈G(·; `),M a(`),M o(`)〉 using (3)-(5) with `(θ) = 1[θ>θ1]x(t1). The market composition
Ψ2 yields a new market tightness t2 and a new cutoff θ2 = θ¯(Ψ2). From θ2 and t2 we get another
market composition Ψ3, and so on. An equilibrium is a fixed point of such an iterative process.
Proposition A.1 For any x ∈ X , there is a unique random search SME given by (θ∗r ,Ψ∗r, t∗r).
The market tightness satisfies
t∗r = 1 +
(
ka − ko
ko
)[
γ + (1− γ)x(t∗r)
γ + (1− γ)x(t∗r)F (θ∗r)
]
, (A1)
and the cutoff θ∗r satisfies the indifference condition
θ∗r = (1− γ)
(
x(t∗r)
γ + x(t∗r)(1− γ)
)
ko
ka
∫ 1
θ∗r
ωdF (ω). (A2)
Proof. Let (θr,Ψr, tr) be a random search SME. By definition, Ψr = 〈G(·; `),M a(`),M o(`)〉
for `(θ) = x(tr)1[θ>θr] for all θ ∈ Θ. As market tightness must be consistent with the market
21
1[·] is the indicator function.
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composition, tr =
Ma(`)
Mo(`)
. Substituting in (4) and (5) for M o(`) and M a(`) yields (A1). It is
clear that tr < Tr for some large but finite Tr.
Taking Ψr as a given, the agents use the cutoff strategy θ¯(Ψr). The value of random search can
then be rewritten as
U r(Ψr) =
x(tr)
trγ + (1− γ)(1−G(θ¯(Ψr); `))x(tr)
∫ 1
θ¯(Ψr)
ωdG(ω; `).
By definition, θr = θ¯(Ψr) = (1 − γ)U r(Ψr). Substituting in (3) and (A1) for G(·; `) and tr
respectively yields (A2).
We now have a pair of fixed point problems. Let R : Θ× [0, Tr]→ Θ× [0, Tr] with R(θ, t) given
by the pair
(
(1− γ)x(t)
x(t)(1− γ) + γ
)
ko
ka
∫ 1
θ
ωdF (ω)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=R1(θ,t)
, 1 +
(
ka − ko
ko
)[
γ + (1− γ)x(t)
γ + (1− γ)x(t)F (θ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
R2(θ,t)

For (θr,Ψr, tr) to be a random search SME, (θr, tr) must be the fixed point of R. Notice that
R is a continuous mapping from a compact space into itself. By Brouwer’s fixed point theorem,
there is at least one fixed point, which proves existence of a random SME for any x ∈ X .
In order to prove uniqueness, I first make two remarks. First, R1(·, t) is decreasing in θ with
R1(0, t) ≥ 0 and R1(1, t) = 0 < 1 for all t ∈ [0, Tr]. Thus, R1(·, t) has a unique fixed point in
Θ for all t ∈ [0, Tr]. Additionally, R1(θ, ·) is increasing in t for all θ ∈ Θ which implies that
the unique fixed point of R1(·, t) is increasing in t. Second, R2(·, t) is decreasing in θ for all
t ∈ [0, Tr], and R2(θ, ·) is increasing and concave in t for all θ ∈ Θ.
Assume that (θ1r , t
1
r) and (θ
2
r , t
2
r) are both fixed points of R. In particular, θir is the unique fixed
point of R1(·; tir) and tir is a fixed point of R2(θir; ·) for i = 1, 2. If t1r ≥ t2r, then θ1r ≥ θ2r . For
some pi ∈ [0, 1], t2r = pit1r. By the monotonicity and concavity of R2, we have
t2r = R2(θ2r , t2r) ≥ R2(θ1r , t2r) = R2(θ1r , pit1r) ≥ piR2(θ1r , t1r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
pit1r=t
2
r
+(1− pi)R2(θ1r , 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
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which would lead to a contradiction unless pi = 1, i.e., t1r = t
2
r. But that implies θ
1
r = θ
2
r . In
other words, there is a unique fixed point (θ∗r , t
∗
r) of R.
A.1.2. Frictional Directed Search Protocol
Under a directed search protocol, we need to consider the market tightness of each sub-market
{S(θ)}θ∈Θ. Given a market composition Ψ = 〈G,Ma,M o〉 and a queueing strategy Q with
both G and Q absolutely continuous, the market tightness of a sub-market S(θ) is given by
t(θ) = Maq(θ)/M og(θ).22
Given a pairing technology x ∈ X , an agent in sub-market S(θ) gets matched with proba-
bility α(θ;Q,Ψ) = x(t(θ))/t(θ) with the convention that x(0)/0 = limt→0 x(t)/t = 1. Similarly,
an object of type θ gets matched to an agent with probability β(θ;Q,Ψ) = x(t(θ)). The value
of directed search in sub-market S(θ) is still given by
Ud(θ;Q,Ψ) = α(θ;Q,Ψ)θ + (1− γ)(1− α(θ;Q,Ψ))Ud(θ;Q,Ψ)
=
α(θ;Q,Ψ)θ
γ + α(θ;Q,Ψ)(1− γ) .
Definition A.2 A directed search SME is given by the tuple (Qd,Ψd, td), where td : Θ → R+
is the market tightness function, such that
(i) Qd(θ) =
∫ θ
0
qd(ω)dω for all θ ∈ Θ with Qd(1) = 1,
(ii) qd(θ) > 0 implies θ ∈ arg maxθ′∈Θ Ud(θ′;Qd,Ψd),
(iii) Ψd = 〈G(·; `),M a(`),M o(`)〉 as given by (3)-(5) with `(·) = x(td(·)), and
(iv) td(θ) =
Ma(`)qd(θ)
Mo(`)g(θ;`)
for almost all θ ∈ Θ.
To get some intuition for Definition A.2, consider the following iterative process: Take some
arbitrary Ψ1 and Q1, and compute the market tightness function t1(·). Using the matching
probabilities x(t1(θ))/t1(θ) for each S(θ), the agents optimally choose which sub-markets to
enter. Aggregating their choices gives a new queueing CDF Q2. We also derive a new market
composition Ψ2 = 〈G(·; `),M a(`),M o(`)〉 using (3)-(5) with `(θ) = x(t1(θ)). The market
composition Ψ2 and the queueing CDF Q2 yield a new market tightness function t2(·), which
22From Lemma 1, a steady state market distribution G has a density function g that is bounded below almost
everywhere by γf > 0. Hence, it is WLOG to consider only distributions with a positive density so that t(θ)
is well-defined everywhere.
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then leads to a new queueing CDF Q3 and a new market composition Ψ3, and so on. An
equilibrium is a fixed point of such an iterative process.
Proposition A.2
For any x ∈ X , there is a unique directed search SME given by (Q∗d,Ψ∗d, t∗d) where
(i) Ψ∗d = 〈G(·; `),M a(`),M o(`)〉 as given by (3)-(5) with `(·) = x(t∗d(·)),
(ii) Q∗d(θ
∗
d) = 0, and
(iii) Ud(θ;Q∗d,Ψ
∗
d) =

θ for θ ≤ θ∗d
θ∗d for θ ≥ θ∗d
.
The market tightness function satisfies
t∗d(θ) =

x(t∗d(θ))
(
θ−(1−γ)θ∗d
γθ∗d
)
> 0 if θ > θ∗d
0 if θ < θ∗d
, (A3)
and the cutoff θ∗d ∈ Θ satisfies the indifference condition
θ∗d =
ko
ka
∫ 1
θ∗d
ω
x(t∗d(ω))
γ + (1− γ)x(t∗d(ω))
dF (ω). (A4)
Proof. Let (Qd,Ψd, td) be a directed search SME. By Lemma 2 (which holds for any x ∈ X ),
there exists a cutoff θd ∈ (0, 1) such that qd(θ) > (=)0 for all θ > (<)θd. By definition,
td(θ) > (=)0 for all θ > (<)θd. Furthermore, U
d(θ;Qd,Ψd) = θd for all θ ≥ θd.
For all θ > θd, U
d(θ;Qd,Ψd) = θd necessitates that α(θ;Qd,Ψd) =
γθd
θ−(1−γ)θd . By definition,
α(θ;Qd,Ψd) =
x(td(θ))
td(θ)
. Equating these two expressions for the agent match probability yields
(A3).
Define D(·; θ, θd) : R+ → R+ by
D(t; θ, θd) = x(t)
(
θ − (1− γ)θd
γθd
)
1[θ>θd],
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For all θ ∈ Θ and all θd ∈ (0, 1), D is continuous, (weakly) increasing, and (weakly) concave in
t. Furthermore, D(Td; θ, θd) < Td for some large but finite Td because limt→∞ x(t) = 1.23
D(·; θ, θd) has one trivial fixed point with 0 = D(0; θ, θd). However, market tightness must
be positive for θ > θd. Thus, we must show that there is a positive fixed point. Given the
properties of D(·; θ, θd), there are only three cases to consider:
1. 0 is the unique fixed point of D(·; θ, θd),
2. There is an interval [0, t′] such that each t ∈ [0, t′] is a fixed point of D(·; θ, θd), and
3. There is a unique t′ > 0 such that {0, t′} are the only fixed points of D(·; θ, θd).
Figure 3a, Figure 3b, and Figure 3c depict Cases 1,2, and 3 respectively. Lemma A.1 shows
that D(·; θ, θd) has a unique positive fixed point for all θd ∈ (0, 1) and all θ > θd by ruling out
Cases 1 and 2.
45°
t′
D
(a) Case 1
45°
t′
D
(b) Case 2
45°
t′
D
(c) Case 3
Figure 3
Lemma A.1 For any given θd ∈ (0, 1) and any θ > θd,
A.1.1. There is a unique positive fixed point t(θ, θd) of D(·; θ, θd), and
A.1.2. For any θ > θ′d > θd, t(θ, θd) ≥ t(θ, θ′d).
Additionally, for any positive and monotone sequence θ > θ1d > θ
2
d > . . . converging to 0,
limθnd→0 t(θ, θ
n
d ) =∞.
23Td depends on θd. In particular, it suffices to take Td >
1−(1−γ)θd
γθd
.
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Proof.
(A.1.1.) Consider an arbitrary θ > θd > 0. Let ∇D(·; θ, θd) be the infimum of the sub-
derivatives of D(·; θ, θd) given by
∇D(t; θ, θd) = lim
→0
D(t+ ; θ, θd)−D(t; θ, θd)

.
Suppose either Case 1 or Case 2 hold which implies D(t; θ, θd) ≤ t for all t > 0. By concavity,
D(0; θ, θd) ≤ D(t; θ, θd) +∇D(t; θ, θd)(0− t) =⇒ ∇D(t; θ, θd)t ≤ D(t; θ, θd) ≤ t.
Thus, for all t > 0, ∇D(t; θ, θd) ≤ 1. Since D(·; θ, θd) is concave in t, ∇D(·; θ, θd) is lower
semi-continuous in t and ∇D(0; θ, θd) ≤ lim inft→0∇D(t; θ, θd) ≤ 1. However, ∇D(0; θ, θd) is
well-defined and given by
∇D(0; θ, θd) = lim
→0
x()
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
(
θ − (1− γ)θd
γθd
)
> 1.
One of the three cases must hold but Case 1 and 2 were just ruled out. Thus, there exists a
unique positive fixed point t(θ, θd) of D(·; θ, θd) for all θd ∈ (0, 1) and all θ > θd.
(A.1.2) D(t; θ, θd) is increasing in t and decreasing in θd. For any θ > θ′d > θd,
t(θ, θ′d) = D(t(θ, θ′d); θ, θ′d) ≤ D(t(θ, θ′d); θ, θd).
As D is concave and increasing in t, t(θ, θd) = D(t(θ, θd); θ, θd) implies t(θ, θ′d) ≤ t(θ, θd).
Finally, for any positive and monotone sequence θ > θ1d > θ
2
d > . . . > 0,
x((t(θ, θnd ))
t(θ, θnd )
=
γθnd
θ − (1− γ)θnd
, ∀n ≥ 1.
If θnd → 0, the RHS also converges to 0. Since x(t)/t is decreasing but always positive for any
finite t, we need limθnd→0 t(θ, θ
n
d ) =∞ for the LHS to also converge to 0.
For any θ ∈ Θ and θd ∈ (0, 1) let t(θ; θd) = 1[θ>θd]t(θ, θd). Clearly, t(θ; θd) is a fixed point of
D(·; θ, θd) and selects the unique positive fixed point whenever θ > θd.
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Lemma A.2 For any sequence {θnd}∞n=1 such that θnd ∈ (0, 1) for all n and θnd converges to
θd ∈ (0, 1), t(·; θnd ) converges pointwise almost everywhere to t(·; θd).
Proof. For any θ 6= θd, I show that for t(θ; θnd ) converges to t(θ; θd).
Take some θ < θd. There exists an N large enough (which depends on θ) such that for all
n > N , θnd > θ and t(θ; θ
n
d ) = 0 = t(θ; θd).
Take some θ > θd. The sequence {θnd}∞n=1 has a monotone sub-sequence {θnmd }∞nm=1 such that
either θnmd ↑ θd or θnmd ↓ θd. Again, there exists a large enough N (depends on θ) such that for
all nm ≥ N , θ > θnmd .
Let C(θ, θnmd ) be the correspondence mapping (θ, θ
nm
d ) into the fixed points of D(·; θ, θnmd ). By
Lemma A.1.1, C(θ, θnmd ) = {0, t(θ; θnmd )} for all nm ≥ N . Additionally, D(·; θ, θnmd ) converges
to D(·; θ, θd) uniformly in t. Hence, C(θ, θd) is upper hemicontinuous in a neighborhood of θd,
i.e., limnm→∞ t(θ; θ
nm
d ) ∈ C(θ, θd) = {0, t(θ; θd)}.24
If θnmd ↑ θd, then for nm ≥ N , t(θ; θnmd ) ≥ t(θ; θnm+1d ) ≥ ... ≥ t(θ; θd) > 0 because t(θ; ·) is de-
creasing (Lemma A.1.2). Hence, infnm t(θ, θ
nm
d ) > 0 which implies limnm→∞ t(θ; θ
nm
d ) = t(θ; θd).
Similarly, if θnmd ↓ θd, then for all nm ≥ N , 0 < t(θ; θnmd ) ≤ t(θ; θnm+1d ) ≤ ... ≤ t(θ; θd). Hence,
supnm t(θ; θ
nm
d ) > 0 which implies limnm→∞ t(θ; θ
nm
d ) = t(θ; θd).
As the market tightness function must also be consistent with the equilibrium market compo-
sition,
M a(`)qd(θ)
M o(`)g(θ; `)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=t(θ;θd)
= x
(
t(θ; θd)
)(θ − (1− γ)θd
γθd
)
, ∀θ > θd > 0,
24Given θ > θd > 0, take  > 0 such that {0, θ} * N(θd). The mapping from (t, θ˜d) ∈ [0, Td] × N(θd) 7→
−
(
t−D(t; θ, θ˜d)
)2
is continuous in (t, θ˜d). Then, C(θ, θ˜d) = arg maxt∈[0,Td]−
(
t−D(t; θ, θ˜d)
)2
is upper
hemicontinuous in θ˜d ∈ N(θd) by the Maximum Theorem.
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where `(θ) = x(t(θ; θd)). Rearranging the equality and integrating over the interval [θd, 1] gives
θd
γM a(`)∫ 1
θd
dQd(ω)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+(1− γ)M o(`)
∫ 1
θd
x(td(ω))dGd(ω)
 = M o(`)∫ 1
θd
ωx(td(ω))dGd(ω).
Using (3)-(5) with `(θ) = x(t(θ; θd)) simplifies the expression to
θd =
ko
ka
∫ 1
θd
ω
x(t(ω; θd))
γ + (1− γ)x(t(ω; θd))dF (ω)︸ ︷︷ ︸
,D(θd)
.
From Lemma A.1, D(·) is a decreasing function on (0, 1). From Lemma A.2 and the dominated
convergence theorem, D(·) is also continuous. We can continuously extend D onto Θ , [0, 1]
by setting D(1) = limθd→1D(θd) = 0 < 1 and
D(0) = lim
θd→0
D(θd) =
ko
ka
∫
Θ
ω lim
θd→0
x(t(ω, θd))
γ + (1− γ)x(t(ω, θd))dF (ω) =
ko
ka
EF [θ] > 0,
where the last equality follows from Lemma A.1 and the assumption that limt→∞ x(t) = 1.
Therefore, there is a unique positive fixed point θ∗d to D(·), and t∗d(θ) = t(θ; θ∗d) for all θ ∈ Θ.
A.1.3. Social Welfare Comparison with Frictional Search
In general, it is difficult to establish which search protocol dominates in terms of social welfare
for any x ∈ X . However, it is possible to show that Theorem 1 continues to hold when the
pairing technology is not too frictional.
Consider a sequence of paring technologies {xn}∞n=1 with xn ∈ X . Given a pairing technology
xn and a search cost γ ∈ (0, 1], let θnr (γ) and θnd (γ) be the SME cutoffs under a random and
directed search protocol as characterized by Proposition A.1 and Proposition A.2. Define social
welfare under the two protocols by W rγ,n = ka
θnr (γ)
1−γ and W
d
γ,n = kaθ
n
d (γ).
Let x¯(t) = min{t, 1} denote the frictionless pairing technology. By assumption, x(·) ≤ x¯(·)
for all x ∈ X . Recall that Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 characterize the SME cutoffs θ∗r(γ)
and θ∗d(γ) under the random and directed search protocol for x¯ and a search cost γ ∈ (0, 1].
The social welfare under the two protocols are given by W rγ = ka
θ∗r (γ)
1−γ and W
d
γ = kaθ
∗
d(γ).
Theorem A.1 Fix γ > 0. Consider a sequence of paring technologies {xn}∞n=1 in X and let
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W iγ,n be the social welfare under protocol i = r, d. If xn converges uniformly to x¯, there exists
a sub-sequence {xnk}∞nk=1 and a large enough N such that W rγ,nk >W dγ,nk for all nk > N .
The proof is an application of standard lower hemi-continuity arguments and is skipped. Briefly,
if xn converges uniformly to x¯, then there is a sub-sequence of pairing technologies {xnk}nk such
that the associated welfare W iγ,nk converges to W
i
γ for i = r, d. From Theorem 1, W
r
γ >W
d
γ
for all γ > 0, and the result follows.
A.2. Non-Scarcity
In this section, I consider the robustness of the welfare result of Theorem 1 to a search market
without scarcity. Fix the in-flowing mass of agents at some ka > 0, and let ko = λka for some
constant λ > 0. The basic model assumed scarcity, i.e., λ ≤ 1. The scarcity assumption no
longer holds when λ > 1.
A.2.1. Random Search Protocol Without Scarcity
Regardless of λ, an object is matched with probability x(t) = min{t, 1} whereas an agent is
matched with probability x(t)/t, where t = Ma/M o is the market tightness. We can therefore
directly apply the results in Proposition A.1.
Proposition A.3 For all λ > 0, there is a unique random search SME given by (θ∗r ,Ψ
∗
r, t
∗
r).
The market tightness satisfies
t∗r = 1 +
(
1− λ
λ
)[
γ + (1− γ) min{t∗r, 1}
γ + (1− γ) min{t∗r, 1}F (θ∗r)
]
, (A5)
and the cutoff θ∗r satisfies the indifference condition
θ∗r = (1− γ)
(
min{t∗r, 1}
γ + min{t∗r, 1}(1− γ)
)
λ
∫ 1
θ∗r
ωdF (ω). (A6)
The market composition Ψ∗r = 〈G(·; `),M a(`),M o(`)〉 is derived from (3)-(5) with `(θ) =
1[θ>θ∗r ] min{t∗r, 1} for all θ ∈ Θ.
The proof is precisely the same as that of Proposition A.1 and is therefore skipped. To see how
this connects to Proposition 1, notice from (A5) that t∗r ≥ 1 when λ ≤ 1. Thus, min{t∗r, 1} = 1
and (A6) simplifies to (9).
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A.2.2. Directed Search Protocol Without Scarcity
The scarcity assumption did not play any role in the analysis of the directed search protocol
in Section 1.4. Hence, the characterization of a directed search SME in Proposition 2 holds for
any λ > 0.
Proposition A.4
For all λ > 0, there is a unique directed search SME, and it is given by (Q∗d,Ψ
∗
d) where
(i) Ψ∗d = 〈G
(·; θ∗d),M a(θ∗d),M o(θ∗d)〉 as given in (6)-(8),
(ii) Q∗d(θ) =

0 if θ ≤ θ∗d∫
θ
θ∗d
λ(ω−(1−γ)θ∗d)(
1−λ(1−γ)(1−F (θ∗d))
)
θ∗d
dF (ω) for θ ≥ θ∗d
.
The cutoff θ∗d ∈ Θ satisfies the indifference condition
θ∗d = λ
∫ 1
θ∗d
ωdF (ω). (A7)
A.2.3. Social Welfare Comparison
For a given (λ, γ) ∈ R>0× (0, 1] and an absolutely continuous F , let θ∗r(λ, γ, F ) be the random
search SME cutoff given by (A6). Social welfare under the random search protocol is given by
W r(λ, γ, F ) = ka
θ∗r (λ,γ,F )
1−γ . Similarly, let θ
∗
d(λ, γ, F ) be the directed search SME cutoffs given
by (A7). Define W d(λ, γ, F ) = kaθ
∗
d(λ, γ, F ) as the social welfare under the directed search
protocol.
Theorem A.2 For any γ ∈ (0, 1] and any absolutely continuous distribution F , there exist
cutoffs 1 < λ(γ, F ) ≤ λ¯(γ, F ) <∞ such that
i. W d(λ, γ, F ) ≤W r(λ, γ, F ) for all λ ≤ λ(γ, F ), and
ii. W d(λ, γ, F ) ≥W r(λ, γ, F ) for all λ ≥ λ¯(γ, F ).
Proof. From Theorem 1, W d(λ, γ, F ) <W r(λ, γ, F ) for all γ ∈ (0, 1] and all absolutely con-
tinuous F when λ ≤ 1. I will therefore focus on the case where λ > 1. By (A5), t∗r < 1.
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From Lemma 1, any steady state market composition Ψ = 〈G,Ma,M o〉 satisfies Ma ≥ ka and
M o = Ma+γ−1(ko−ka) = Ma+γ−1ka(λ−1). Thus, any steady state market tightness satisfies
t =
Ma
M o
=
Ma
Ma + γ−1ka(λ− 1) ≥
γ
γ + λ− 1 , t.
Define the mapping P(·; t) : Θ→ R+ by
P(θ; t) =
(
t
γ + t(1− γ)
)
λ
∫ 1
θ
ωdF (ω)
for 0 < t < 1. The mapping P(·; t) is strictly decreasing in θ for all t ∈ (0, 1) with P(0; t) > 0
and P(1; t) = 0 < 1; hence, P(·; t) has a unique fixed point in Θ. Additionally, P(θ; ·) is
increasing in t for all θ ∈ Θ. Thus, the fixed point of P(·; t) is increasing in t.
Notice that for all θ ∈ Θ,
P(θ; t∗r) ≥ P(θ; t) =
∫ 1
θ
ωdF (ω).
From Proposition A.3, θ∗r(λ, γ, F ) is the unique fixed point of (1 − γ)P(·; t∗r) while θ∗r(1, γ, F )
is the unique fixed point of (1− γ)P(·; t). Moreover, θ∗r(λ, γ, F ) ≥ θ∗r(1, γ, F ) because t∗r ≥ t.
Define
λ(γ, F ) = sup
{
λ : θ∗d(λ, γ, F ) ≤
θ∗r(1, γ, F )
1− γ
}
.
θ∗d(λ, γ, F ) is a continuous and strictly increasing function of λ, and θ
∗
d(λ, γ, F ) <
θ∗r (λ,γ,F )
1−γ for
all λ ∈ (0, 1] by Theorem 1. Hence, λ(γ, F ) > 1. Additionally, for all 1 < λ ≤ λ(γ, F ),
W d(λ, γ, F ) = kaθ
∗
d(λ, γ, F ) ≤ ka
θ∗r(1, γ, F )
1− γ ≤ ka
θ∗r(λ, γ, F )
1− γ = W
r(λ, γ, F )
which proves the first result.
To prove the second result, consider the single-agent problem under the random search protocol.
Let U rSA be the payoff under the single-agent problem given by
U rSA =
∫
Θ
max{θ, (1− γ)U rSA}dF (ω),
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and let θSAr (γ, F ) = (1− γ)U rSA be the unique indifference cutoff. The single-agent payoff is an
upper bound of the equilibrium payoff in a random search market, i.e., θSAr (γ, F ) ≥ θ∗r(λ, γ, F )
for all finite λ.25
Define
λ¯(γ, F ) = inf
{
λ : θ∗d(λ, γ, F ) ≥
θSAr (γ, F )
1− γ
}
.
Recall that θ∗d(λ, γ, F ) is a continuous and strictly increasing function of λ. Additionally,
limλ→∞ θ∗d(λ, γ, F ) = 1 which is the outcome for a single-agent directed search problem. On
the other hand, the outcome for a single-agent random search problem is given by
U rSA =
θSAr (γ, F )
1− γ =
1
1− (1− γ)F(θSAr (γ, F ))
∫ 1
θSAr (γ,F )
ωdF (ω) ≤ EF
[
θ|θ ≥ θSAr (γ, F )
]
< 1
which implies λ¯(γ, F ) <∞. Finally, for all λ > λ¯(γ, F ),
W d(λ, γ, F ) = kaθ
∗
d(λ, γ, F ) ≥ ka
θSAr (γ, F )
1− γ ≥ ka
θ∗r(λ, γ, F )
1− γ = W
r(λ, γ, F ),
which proves the second result.
A.3. Hybrid Search with Coarse Information
I have considered two search protocols so far: random search in which the agents cannot observe
the quality of an object prior to pairing with it, and directed search in which the agents have
full information about an object’s quality ex-ante. In this section, I consider a market which
is divided into a finite number of sub-markets that provide the agents with coarse ex-ante
information about quality. The agents use a hybrid search protocol in which they first direct
their search to one of the sub-markets and then randomly sample the objects within their chosen
sub-market. The main result of this section is to show that social welfare and equilibrium payoffs
are lower under a hybrid search protocol than under a random search protocol.
Let {Sk}nk=1 denote a monotone n-partition of Θ such that S1 = [x0, x1), . . . , Sn = [xn−1, xn]
with 0 = x0 < x1 < . . . < xn = 1.
26 In what follows, I refer to Sk as sub-market k. In a hybrid
search protocol, each agent first chooses one of the n sub-markets to enter and then searches
25It is straightforward to show that θSAr (γ, F ) = limλ→∞ θ
∗
r(λ, γ, F ).
26For n = 1, I adopt the convention that S1 = [0, 1].
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using a random search protocol within the chosen sub-market.27
Let Fk = F (xk)− F (xk−1) for k = 1, . . . n. Given a market composition Ψ = 〈G,Ma,M o〉,
similarly define Gk = G(xk)−G(xk−1). Let Mak denote the mass of objects and agents in Sk so
that
∑n
k=1M
a
k = M
a.
Let αk = min
{
MoGk
Mak
, 1
}
and βk = min
{
Mak
MoGk
, 1
}
denote the agent and the object pairing
probabilities respectively in Sk. Denote the agent entry probabilities by ζ , {ζk}nk=1 with∑n
k=1 ζk = 1 where ζk ≥ 0 is the probability that a newly arrived agent chooses sub-market
Sk. I refer to Sk as an on-path sub-market if k ∈ Supp(ζ) , {k′ : ζk′ > 0} and as off-path if
k /∈ Supp(ζ).
Under a hybrid search protocol, an agent’s value of entering an on-path sub-market Sk is
given by
Unk = αk
∫
Sk
max{θ, (1− γ)Unk }
dG(θ)
Gk
+ (1− αk)(1− γ)Unk . (A8)
In equilibrium, an agent who enters an on-path sub-market Sk uses a cutoff strategy θ¯k ∈ Sk
such that she matches with any object in Sk with quality θ > θ¯k and rejects any object with
quality θ < θ¯k. The cutoff is determined by the indifference condition
θ¯k ≥ (1− γ)Unk (ICk)
with equality if θ¯k > inf Sk = xk−1. Additionally, the agents must be indifferent across all
on-path sub-markets, i.e., Unk = U
n
k′ , Un for all k, k′ ∈ Supp(ζ).
For each k ∈ Supp(ζ) and each θ ∈ Sk, the on-path inflow-outflow dynamics for objects
must satisfy
M o
(
G(θ)−G(xk−1)
)
γ =ko
(
F (θ)− F (xk−1)
)
, ∀θ < θ¯k, (A9)
M o
(
G(θ)−G(θ¯k)
)(
γ + βk(1− γ)
)
=ko
(
F (θ)− F (θ¯k)
)
, ∀θ > θ¯k, (A10)
27In particular, the agents and objects in each Sk are randomly paired to each other. Upon pairing with an
object, an agent observes the object’s true quality. She then chooses to either match with the object and
exit, or to reject the object and search again. The in-flow and out-flow of agents and objects is the same
as the basic model. Once again, it is without loss of generality to assume that an agent remains in the first
sub-market she enters. The agents must be indifferent among all on-path sub-markets. As their payoffs are
stationary, it does not matter if they remain in the first on-path sub-market they enter or if they randomize
51
while the on-path inflow-outflow dynamics for the agents is given by
Mak
(
γ + αk(1− γ)
(
G(xk)−G(θ¯k)
Gk
))
= kaζk. (A11)
For an off-path sub-market Sk, M
a
k = 0 which implies that αk = 1, and βk = 0. As objects
in Sk leave the market only via death, the inflow-outflow dynamics satisfy
M o
(
G(θ)−G(xk−1)
)
γ = ko
(
F (θ)− F (xk−1)
)
, ∀θ ∈ Sk. (A12)
An agent’s payoff from a one-shot deviation into an off-path sub-market Sk is given by
Unk =
∫
Sk
max{θ, (1− γ)Un}dG(θ)
Gk
=
∫
Sk
max{θ, (1− γ)Un}dF (θ)
Fk
, (A13)
where the second equality follows from (A12).
Definition A.3 Given a monotone n-partition {Sk}nk=1, a hybrid search SME is given by a
market composition Ψ = 〈G,Ma,M o〉, entry probabilities ζ , {ζk}nk=1, and cutoffs {θ¯k}k∈Supp(ζ)
such that
(i) For all k, k′ ∈ Supp(ζ), Unk = Unk′ , Un as given by (A8),
(ii) For all k ∈ Supp(ζ), θ¯k ∈ Sk and satisfies (ICk) with equality if θ¯k > inf Sk,
(iii) For all k /∈ Supp(ζ), Unk is given by (A13) and Un ≥ Unk , and
(iv) The market composition is derived from (A9)-(A12).
The first two conditions describe the on-path hybrid search SME outcomes: Taking the market
composition as a given, (i) each agent must be indifferent among all on-path sub-markets,
and (ii) the cutoff strategy an agent uses in an on-path sub-market is sequentially rational.
Condition (iii) states that the agents cannot be better off by taking a one-shot deviation to
any off-path sub-market. Finally, condition (iv) states that the market composition must be
consistent with the agents’ entry probabilities and cutoff strategies.
The following lemma simplifies the characterization of a hybrid search SME.
Lemma A.3 For any hybrid search SME, there exits a threshold k∗ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} such that
ζk > 0 if, and only if, k ≥ k∗. Additionally, if k∗ < n, then θ¯k = inf Sk = xk−1 and βk = 1 for
all k > k∗.
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Proof. Suppose in some hybrid search SME, ζk > 0 = ζk′ for some k < k
′ ≤ n. The on-path
equilibrium payoff Unk is given by (A8) and satisfies
Unk ≤
∫
Sk
max{θ, (1− γ)Unk }
dG(θ)
Gk
≤
∫
Sk
max{θ, θ¯k}dG(θ)
Gk
≤ xk = supSk.
As Sk′ is an off-path sub-market, U
n
k′ is given by (A13). Since the partition is monotone,
Unk′ = EF [θ|θ ∈ Sk′ ] > inf Sk′ ≥ supSk ≥ Unk , which yields a profitable deviation. Hence, there
exists some k∗ such that ζk > 0 if, and only if, k ≥ k∗.
Now suppose that k∗ < n and consider some k > k∗. Then θ¯k > θ¯k∗ ≥ (1− γ)Un. From (ICk),
θ¯k 6= (1− γ)Un only if θ¯k = inf Sk = xk−1. Finally, a necessary condition for Unk = Unk∗ is that
αk < 1 which implies (by definition) αk =
MoGk
Mak
and βk = 1.
Theorem A.3 Social welfare and equilibrium payoffs are higher under a random search pro-
tocol than under any hybrid search protocol with a monotone n-partition of Θ.
Proof. For any hybrid search SME, there exists a k∗ by Lemma A.3 such that agents enter
only {Sk}k≥k∗ . For any k > k∗ (if k∗ < n), θ¯k = xk−1, αk = MoGkMak , and βk = 1. Then, (A8) can
be rewritten as
Unk =
αk
γ + (1− γ)αk
∫
Sk
ω
dG(ω)
Gk
=
ko
kaζk
∫
Sk
ωdF (ω)
where the second equality follows from simplifying (A10) and (A11) to
M o
(
G(θ)−G(xk−1)
)
= ko
(
F (θ)− F (xk−1)
)
, ∀θ ∈ Sk,
Mak (γ + αk(1− γ)) = kaζk.
For Sk∗ , (A8) can be rewritten as
Unk∗ =
αk∗
γ + (1− γ)αk∗
(
G(xk∗ )−G(θ¯k∗ )
Gk∗
) ∫ xk∗
θ¯k∗
ω
dG(ω)
Gk∗
.
From (A11), we can express γ + (1− γ)αk∗
(
G(xk∗ )−G(θ¯k∗ )
Gk∗
)
as kaζk∗
Ma
k∗
. Furthermore, by definition
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of the pairing probabilities, αk∗ = βk∗
MoGk∗
Ma
k∗
. Finally, from (A10), we get M o
(
G(θ)−G(θ¯k∗)
)
=
ko
(
F (θ)−F (θ¯k∗)
)(
γ + βk∗(1− γ)
)−1
for all θ > θ¯k∗ . Substituting in these expressions into U
n
k∗
yields
Unk∗ =
ko
kaζk∗
(
βk∗
γ + (1− γ)βk∗
)∫ xk∗
θ¯k∗
ωdF (ω).
Since agents must be indifferent among all the on-path sub-markets, the equilibrium payoffs
must satisfy Unk = U
n
k∗ = U
n for all k ≥ k∗. Additionally, ∑nk=k∗ ζk = 1, and
Un =
n∑
k=k∗
ζkU
n
k
=
ko
ka
(
βk∗
γ + (1− γ)βk∗
∫ xk∗
θ¯k∗
ωdF (ω) +
∫ 1
xk∗
ωdF (ω)
)
≤ko
ka
∫ 1
θ¯k∗
ωdF (ω)
=U(θ¯k∗),
where U(x) =
∫ 1
x
ωdF . From Proposition 1, the unique equilibrium payoff under random search
SME is given by U r = θ
∗
r
1−γ = U(θ
∗
r).
Suppose Un > U r. As U(·) is a strictly decreasing function, it must be that θ¯k∗ < θ∗r . However,
this would imply
U r =
θ∗r
1− γ >
θ¯k∗
1− γ ≥ U
n
where the last inequality follows from (ICk∗). Therefore, in any hybrid search SME, U
n ≤ U r.
As social welfare is just a re-scaling of the equilibrium payoffs by ka, this concludes the proof.
Remark A.1 Notice that Theorem A.3 does not claim existence of a hybrid search SME. In
fact, there are n-partitions of Θ for which an equilibrium does not exist as there are too many
(in)equalities that need to be satisfied simultaneously. First, agents must be indifferent across
all on-path sub-markets with Unk∗ = U
n
k∗+1 = . . . = U
n
n . Second, the cutoff θ¯k∗ is linked to U
n
k∗
(and therefore all Unk for k ≥ k∗) through (ICk∗). Finally, the agents must choose to not deviate
down with Unk∗ ≥ Unk∗−1. Nonetheless, the possible non-existence of such equilibrium outcomes
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does not invalidate the general negative result of the theorem.
A.4. Taste Heterogeneity
In this section, I generalize the basic model so that objects are both horizontally and vertically
differentiated, and agents have heterogeneous tastes. I consider three different search protocols:
a random search protocol in which agents have no information, a partially directed search
protocol in which the agents have information only about the horizontal attributes of objects,
and a directed search protocol in which the agents have full information about both the objects’
horizontal attributes and quality.
Objects are horizontally differentiated based on two horizontal attribute types denoted by
j = 1, 2. Each attribute j is further vertically differentiated by quality with θj ∈ Θj , [0, 1].
There are also two types of agents denoted by i = 1, 2. As in the basic model, there are ka
new agents and ko new objects that arrive in each period. A fraction pi ∈ (0, 1) of the incoming
agents and objects are type 1. Additionally, the quality of a newly arrived object of attribute
j is distributed according to an absolutely continuous distribution function Fj.
A type i agent’s ex-post payoff from matching with a type θj ∈ Θj object is given by
ui(θj) = θj1[i=j]. In other words, a type 1 agent is only compatible with a type 1 object and a
type 2 agent is only compatible with a type 2 object. The assumption is stark but it allows for
a simple generalization of the results so far, Importantly, it also provides the best setting for
directed search to facilitate assortative matching and thus “stacks the deck” against random
search protocols.
A.4.1. Random Search Protocol
Under a random search protocol, the agents get no information about quality or the horizontal
attribute. Let Ψ1 = 〈G1,Ma1 ,M o1 〉 be the market composition of the type 1 agents and objects,
and similarly define Ψ2. Let M
a = Ma1 + M
a
2 and M
o = M o1 + M
o
2 . Each object of type j is
paired to a compatible agent with probability Maj /M
a while each agent of type i is paired to a
compatible object with probability M oi /M
a.
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The value of random search for a type i agent is given by
U ri =
M oi
Ma
∫
Θi
max{ωi, (1− γ)U ri }dGi(ωi) +
(
1− M
o
i
Ma
)
(1− γ)U ri
=
M oi
Maγ +M oi (1− γ)
(
1−Gi(θ¯i)
) ∫ 1
θ¯i
ωidGi(ωi),
where θ¯i is a type i agent’s optimal cutoff derived from the indifference condition θ¯i = (1−γ)U ri .
The inflow-outflow conditions for type i agents is given
Mai
(
Maγ +M oi (1− γ)
(
1−Gi(θ¯i)
)
Ma
)
= kapii (A14)
where, with some abuse of notation, pii is the fraction of new type i agents. Similarly, the
inflow-outflow conditions for type j objects is given by
M ojGj(θj)γ =kopijFj(θi), ∀θj < θ¯j (A15)
M oj
(
Gj(θj)−Gj(θ¯j)
)(Maj + γMa−j
Ma
)
=kopij
(
Fj(θj)− Fj(θ¯j)
)
, ∀θj > θ¯j (A16)
where, again with some abuse of notation, pij is the fraction of new type j objects. Using (A14)
and (A16), the value of random search simplifies to
U ri =
ko
ka
(
Mai
Mai + γM
a
−i
)∫ 1
θ¯i
ωidFi(ωi), (A17)
and the mass of type i agents simplifies to
Mai =
kapii
(
Mai + γM
a
−i
)
γMai + γ
2Ma−i + (1− γ)kopii
(
1− Fi(θ¯i)
) . (A18)
Let T :
∏2
i=1 Θi×
[
kapii,
kapii
γ
]
→∏2i=1 Θi× [kapii, kapiiγ ] be the function that maps the tuple
(θ¯i,M
a
i )i=1,2 into T
(
(θ¯i,M
a
i )i=1,2
)
given by(
(1− γ)ko
ka
(
Mai
Mai + γM
a
−i
)∫ 1
θ¯i
ωidFi(ωi),
kapii
(
Mai + γM
a
−i
)
γMai + γ
2Ma−i + (1− γ)kopii
(
1− Fi(θ¯i)
))
i=1,2
.
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An equilibrium outcome in a random search SME is given by a fixed point of T(·) which exists
as T(·) is a continuous mapping from a compact space into itself. Given pi ∈ (0, 1), social
welfare is given by28
Wrpi =
{∑
i=1,2
kapii
θ∗i,r
1− γ :
(
θ∗i,r,M
a∗
i,r
)
i=1,2
= T
((
θ∗i,r,M
a∗
i,r
)
i=1,2
)}
.
A.4.2. Partially Directed Search Protocol
Under a partially directed search protocol, the agents get full information about the objects’
horizontal attribute but get no information about quality. The search market is divided into
two sub-markets {Sj}j=1,2 so that sub-market Sj contains only objects of type j. The agents
can choose which sub-market to enter but observe the quality θj of an object only after pairing
to it.
The agents derive a positive utility only if they match with a compatible object. Therefore,
each type i agent will enter Sj if, and only, if j = i. In other words, the sub-markets allow
for perfect assortative matching based on attribute types. Furthermore, the strategic choices
of the agents in sub-market Sj imposes no externalities on sub-market S−j because the agents
perfectly sort themselves into the two sub-markets.
Within each sub-market Sj, the agents use a random search protocol. In each period, a
mass of kapij new agents and kopij new objects arrive into Sj where the new objects’ quality
distribution is given by Fj. Except for a parametric change in the exogenous variables, the
search problem in Sj is strategically equivalent to the random search protocol in the basic
model. I can thus directly apply the result from Proposition 1.
In a partially directed search protocol, a type i agent enters sub-market Si, matches with all
objects of quality θi > θ
∗
i,p (subscript p for partially directed), and rejects all objects of quality
θi < θ
∗
i,p. The cutoff is characterized by the unique solution to
θ∗i,p = (1− γ)
∫ 1
θ∗i,p
ωidFi(ωi), (A19)
and social welfare is given by
W ppi =
∑
i=1,2
kapii
θ∗i,p
1− γ .
28The formulation accommodates for the possibility of multiple SME outcomes. The uniqueness or multiplicity
of SME’s is tangential to the purposes of this section.
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A.4.3. Directed Search Protocol
Under a directed search protocol, the agents get full information about both the objects’ hori-
zontal attribute and quality. As in the partially directed search protocol, the search market is
divided into two sub-markets {Sj}j=1,2 so that sub-market Sj contains only objects of type j.
Furthermore, each sub-market Sj is further divided into sub-sub-markets {Sj(θj)}θj∈Θj . The
agents can choose in which sub-sub-market to search.
Once again, each type i agent will enter Sj if, and only, if j = i. Within each sub-market
Sj, the agents use a directed search protocol. Except for a parametric change in the exogenous
variables, the search problem in Sj is strategically equivalent to the directed search protocol in
the basic model. I can thus directly apply the result from Proposition 2.
In a directed search protocol, type i agents enter sub-market Si and queue only at sub-sub-
markets {Si(θi)}θi≥θ∗i,d . The cutoff is characterized by the unique solution to
θ∗i,d =
∫ 1
θ∗i,p
ωidFi(ωi), (A20)
and social welfare is given by
W dpi =
∑
i=1,2
kapii
θ∗i,d
1− γ .
A.4.4. Social Welfare Comparison with Taste Heterogeneity
This section extends the intuition of Theorem 1 to the case with horizontal differentiation and
heterogeneous tastes. In the current simple model, providing information about the horizon-
tal attributes facilitates assortative matching between compatible agents and objects without
inducing congestion. On the other hand, information about quality leads to congestion exter-
nalities as in the basic model.
Under a directed search protocol, there is a welfare gain due to the assortative matching
but a welfare loss due to congestion. Which of these two forces dominates depends on the
parameters. However, the following result shows that when the level of heterogeneity is small,
social welfare would be higher if the agents had no information (random search protocol) than if
they had full information (directed search protocol). Yet, social welfare is always unambiguously
higher when the agents only get information about the horizontal attributes (partially directed
search protocol).
Theorem A.4 For all pi ∈ (0, 1), W ppi >W dpi , and W ppi >W rpi for all W rpi ∈ Wrpi. Furthermore,
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W rpi >W
d
pi for all W
r
pi ∈ Wrpi whenever pi(1− pi) is small enough.
Proof. The proof for W ppi >W
d
pi immediately follows from the same argument as the proof of
Theorem 1.
Let (θ∗i,r,M
a∗
i,r )i=1,2 be a random search SME outcome. Taking {Ma∗i,r}i=1,2 as a given, the cutoff
θ∗i,r is the unique fixed point of the function
(1− γ)ko
ka
(
Ma∗i,r
Ma∗i,r + γM
a∗
−i,r
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1
Ui(·)
where Ui(θi) =
∫ 1
θi
ωidFi. On the other hand, the cutoff θ
∗
i,p under a partially directed search
protocol is the unique fixed point of (1−γ) ko
ka
Ui(·) as given by (A19). Because Ui is a decreasing
function, θ∗i,r < θ
∗
i,p. As the choice of the random search SME was arbitrary,
W rpi =
∑
i=1,2
kapii
θ∗i,r
1− γ <W
p
pi =
∑
i=1,2
kapii
θ∗i,p
1− γ
for all W rpi ∈ Wrpi.
Additionally, from (A18), any random search SME satisfies Ma∗i,r ∈ [kapii, kapiiγ ] for i = 1, 2. As
pi approaches 1, Ma∗2,r approaches 0 which implies
Ma∗1,r
Ma∗1,r+γM
a∗
2,r
approaches 1. In the limit, the gap
between θ∗1,r and θ
∗
1,p vanishes. However,
θ∗i,p
1−γ > θ
∗
i,d for all i = 1, 2 and all pi ∈ [0, 1]. Hence,
θ∗1,r
1−γ > θ
∗
1,d when pi is close to 1. As social welfare is primarily determined by the welfare of type
1 agents when pi is close to 1, we also have W rpi >W
d
pi for all W
r
pi ∈ Wrpi. The same argument
establishes the welfare ranking across the three protocols when pi is close to 0 as welfare is
primarily determined by the payoff of type 2 agents.
B. Search with Ex-post Transfers: Relaxing Assumption 1
In Section 2.3 of the main text, I characterize an equilibrium outcome in a directed search
market by imposing the following assumption:
Assumption 2
(i) wd(θ;Q,Ψ) is continuous in θ.
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(ii) For all θ ∈ Supp(q), wd, Vd, and Ud are given by (14), (15), and (16) respectively.
(iii) For all θ′, θ′′ /∈ Supp(q), |wd(θ′;Q,Ψ)− wd(θ′′;Q,Ψ)| < |θ′ − θ′′|.
In this section, I relax this assumption and characterize the equilibrium outcome(s) when
both on-path and off-path wages are determined by Nash bargaining. I also show that relaxing
Assumption 1 introduces a new trade-off for firms.
B.0.1. On-path Sub-markets
Nothing changes for on-path sub-markets; for all θ ∈ Supp(q), wd, Vd, and Ud are given by
(14), (15), and (16) respectively. Additionally, firms must be indifferent between all on-path
sub-markets, i.e., for all θ′, θ′′ ∈ Supp(q), Ud(θ′;Q,Ψ) = Ud(θ′′;Q,Ψ) = Ud(Q,Ψ). Note that
for all on-path sub-markets, a firm’s payoff satisfies
Ud(Q,Ψ) ≤ inf
θ∈Supp(q)
ρθ
γ + (1− γ)ρ. (B1)
B.0.2. Off-path Sub-markets
For a sub-market S(θ) with θ /∈ Supp(q), the worker match probability is β(θ;Q,Ψ) = 0, which
implies Vd(θ;Q,Ψ) = 0. Suppose a firm deviates to an off-path sub-market S(θ) for one period.
Wages are still determined by Nash bargaining but are now given by the solution to
wd(θ;Q,Ψ) = arg max
w∈R
(
θ − w − (1− γ)Ud(Q,Ψ)
)ρ
(w − 0)1−ρ
=(1− ρ)
(
θ − (1− γ)Ud(Q,Ψ)
)
where Ud(Q,Ψ) is the firm’s on-path payoff. Hence, the firm’s one-shot deviation payoff is given
by
Ud(θ;Q,Ψ) = θ − (1− ρ)
(
θ − (1− γ)Ud(Q,Ψ)
)
.
In equilibrium, this one-shot deviation payoff must be (weakly) worse than the on-path payoff,
i.e., for all θ /∈ Supp(q),
ρθ
γ + (1− γ)ρ ≤ U
d(Q,Ψ). (B2)
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B.0.3. Cutoff Strategies
Suppose in equilibrium there exist sub-markets S(θ′) and S(θ′′) such that θ′ > θ′′, θ′′ ∈ Supp(q),
and θ′ /∈ Supp(q). Then
ρθ′
γ + (1− γ)ρ ≤︸︷︷︸
by (B2)
Ud(Q,Ψ) ≤︸︷︷︸
by (B1)
ρθ′′
γ + (1− γ)ρ
which is a contradiction. Hence, there exists some cutoff θd such that θ ∈ Supp(q) if θ > θd
and θ /∈ Supp(q) if θ < θd. Furthermore,
lim
θ↑θd
Ud(θ;Q,Ψ) = ρθd
γ + (1− γ)ρ = U
d(Q,Ψ). (B3)
Note that payoffs and match probabilities must be continuous on-path and at θd; otherwise
the firms have a strict incentive to deviate. This implies that limθ↓θd β(θ;Q,Ψ) = 0 and
limθ↓θd α(θ;Q,Ψ) = 1. Additionally, β(θ;Q,Ψ) ∈ (0, 1) and α(θ;Q,Ψ) = 1 for θ in a right
neighborhood of θd.
However, there must also exist another cutoff θ¯d ∈ (θd, 1) such that β(θ;Q,Ψ) = 1 and
α(θ;Q,Ψ) ∈ (0, 1) for all θ > θ¯d. Otherwise, the firms would always be on the short-side
of each on-path sub-market, violating the scarcity assumption. By continuity, β(θ¯d;Q,Ψ) =
α(θ¯d;Q,Ψ) = 1, and by (16),
Ud(θ¯d;Q,Ψ) = ρα(θ¯d;Q,Ψ)θ¯d
γ + (1− γ)
(
ρα(θ¯d;Q,Ψ) + (1− ρ)β(θ¯d;Q,Ψ)
) = ρθ¯d.
Since θ¯d ∈ Supp(q), we also have Ud(θ¯d;Q,Ψ) = Ud(Q,Ψ) = ρθdγ+(1−γ)ρ . Thus,
θd = θ¯d
(
γ + (1− γ)ρ). (B4)
B.0.4. Match Probabilities
For off-path sub-markets, the firm match probability is always 1 while the worker match proba-
bility is always 0. For on-path sub-markets, the match probabilities must be calibrated in such
a way that the firms are indifferent among all the on-path sub-markets.
For each sub-market S(θ) with θ ∈ (θd, θ¯d), α(θ;Q,Ψ) = 1. From (16) and (B3), the
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on-path indifference condition Ud(θ;Q,Ψ) = Ud(Q,Ψ) can be expressed as
ρθ
γ + (1− γ)
(
ρ+ (1− ρ)β(θ;Q,Ψ)
) = ρθd
γ + (1− γ)ρ
=⇒ β(θ;Q,Ψ) = θ − θd
θ¯d(1− γ)(1− ρ)
. (B5)
Similarly, for each sub-market S(θ) with θ ∈ (θd, 1], β(θ;Q,Ψ) = 1. Thus, the on-path indif-
ference condition Ud(θ;Q,Ψ) = Ud(Q,Ψ) can be expressed as
ρα(θ;Q,Ψ)θ
γ + (1− γ)
(
ρα(θ;Q,Ψ) + 1− ρ
) = ρθd
γ + (1− γ)ρ
=⇒ α(θ;Q,Ψ) = θ¯d(1− ρ(1− γ))
θ − θ¯dρ(1− γ)
. (B6)
θ
1
1
θ¯dθd
α(·;Q,Ψ)
β(·;Q,Ψ)
α, β
Figure 4: The dashed red curve line plots the worker match probabilities while the solid black
curve depicts the firm match probability.
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B.0.5. Market Composition and Queueing CDF
The market composition can now easily be derived from (3)-(5) in Lemma 1 with
`(θ) = β(θ;Q,Ψ) =

0 if θ ≤ θd
θ−θd
θ¯d(1−γ)(1−ρ) if θ ∈ [θd, θ¯d]
1 if θ ≥ θ¯d
In particular, we have
M a(`) =
1
γ
(
ka − ko(1− γ)(1− F (θ¯d))− ko
∫ θ¯d
θd
ω − θd
ω − θ¯dρ
dF (θ)
)
. (B7)
However, the inflow-outflow of firms can also be expressed as
ka =M
a(`)
∫ 1
θd
(
α(ω;Q,Ψ)(1− γ) + γ
)
dQ(ω)
=M a(`)
∫ 1
θ¯d
(
M o(`)g(ω; `)
M a(`)q(ω)
(1− γ) + γ
)
q(ω)dω +M a(`)
(
Q(θ¯d)−Q(θd)
)
=ko(1− γ)(1− F (θ¯d)) +M a(`)
(
γ +Q(θ¯d)(1− γ)
)
where the second line follows because α(θ;Q,Ψ) = 1 for θ ∈ (θd, θ¯d) and α(θ;Q,Ψ) = M
og(θ)
Maq(θ)
< 1
for θ ∈ (θ¯d, 1], and the last line follows from (3)-(4) and Q(θd) = 0.29 The expression implies
M a(`)Q(θ¯d) =
ko
1− γ
∫ θ¯d
θd
ω − θd
ω − θ¯dρ
dF (θ). (B8)
B.0.6. Equilibrium Characterization
For all θ > θ¯d, firms are on the long-side of the sub-market, i.e, there is congestion. Hence,
α(θ;Q,Ψ) = min
{
M o(`)g(θ; `)
M a(`)q(θ)
, 1
}
=
M o(`)g(θ; `)
M a(`)q(θ)
=
kof(θ)
M a(`)q(θ)
.
29Recall that off-path markets are θ < θd.
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From (B6), we have
kof(θ)
M a(`)q(θ)
=
θ¯d(1− ρ(1− γ))
θ − θ¯dρ(1− γ)
.
Rearranging and integrating over the interval (θ¯d, 1] gives
θ¯d
((
1− ρ(1− γ))M a(`)(1−Q(θ¯d))+ ρko(1− γ)(1− F (θ¯d))) = ko ∫ 1
θ¯d
θdF (θ).
Replacing M a(`) and M a(`)Q(θ¯d) with (B7) and (B8) respectively, we have
θ¯d =
koγ
ka
(
1− ρ(1− γ))− ko(1− ρ)(1− γ)(1− F (θ¯d))
∫ 1
θ¯d
ωdF (ω) (B9)
+
(
θ¯d
1− γ
)(
ko(1− ρ(1− γ))
ka
(
1− ρ(1− γ))− ko(1− ρ)(1− γ)(1− F (θ¯d))
)∫ θ¯d
θd
ω − θd
ω − θ¯dρ
dF (ω)
,D(θ¯d).
Notice that D is only a function of θ¯d because we can use (B4) to express θd in terms of θ¯d. It
is straightforward to check that D is a continuous function with
D(0) =
koγ
ka(1− ρ(1− γ))− ko(1− ρ)(1− γ)EF [θ] > 0
and
D(1) ≤ ko
ka
(
1− F(γ + (1− γ)ρ)) < 1.
Hence, by the intermediate value theorem, there is at least one θ¯d such that θ¯d = D(θ¯d) which
establishes existence of an equilibrium. However, the equilibrium need not be unique.
The firms can settle and hire a worker for which there is little competition. The cutoff θ¯d
is the highest productivity type any firm can hire without entering a congested sub-market.
Hence, the LHS of (B9) is the value of settling.
In equilibrium, the firms equate the value of settling with the value of search. The on-path
sub-markets are now divided into thin sub-markets ∪θd<θ<θ¯dS(θ) in which the firms are on
the short-side, and congested sub-markets ∪θ>θdS(θ) in which the firms are on the long-side.
The first term on the RHS of (B9) is the value of searching in a congested sub-market for a
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worker with productivity higher than θ¯d. Notice that this first term is the same as (17). Hence,
the equilibrium characterization without Assumption 1 is similar to the characterization in
Proposition 4 except there is now an additional second term capturing the value of search in a
thin sub-market.
The workers in the thin sub-markets are less productive than θ¯d and one may expect the
firms to not be interested in these workers. However, the workers in the thin sub-markets are at
a disadvantage when they bargain with firms because if they refuse a wage offer, they may not be
matched again in the next period. Thus, they are willing to accept low wage offers. Therefore,
a firm’s total value of search is a combination of the value of searching for a productive worker
by waiting in a congested sub-market and the value of hiring a less productive worker for a low
wage.
In general, it is not obvious (at least to me) whether random search or directed search yields
a higher welfare. However, notice that when γ or ρ equal 1, θd = θ¯d, and there is a unique
directed search SME characterized by
θ¯d =
ko
ka
∫ 1
θ¯d
ωdF (ω). (B10)
Since D is continuous in both γ and ρ, all fixed points solving (B9) converge to the unique
fixed point solving (B10) (by upper hemi-continuity) as either ρ or γ converge to 1. Thus, we
can conclude that the main result of Theorem 2—random search with ex-post transfers is more
efficient than directed search with ex-post transfers—continues to hold whenever (1− ρ)(1− γ)
is close to 0.
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